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This dissertation looks at alternative ways in which time is poeticized through 
ethical discourse. Here, the ethical imaginaries of Immanuel Kant, Aristippus the 
Cyrenaic, and Sidi al Mukhtar al Kunti are imaginal watersheds in the sense that each 
consolidated a poetic bloom of ethical and political imaginaries. Their respective impact 
on political life is conceived through the distributive tendencies for violence that these 
poetics help configure. The poetic epidemics which these authors’ works consolidated 
and distributed in the form of international ethical thought constituted poetic epidemics 
in cosmopolitanism because of their linking of ethics to an international space. 
Immanuel Kant was an 18th century German philosopher writing in Konigsberg and 
theorist of international constitutionalism who required a Newtonian poetics of objectile 
political units coupled with a teleological vision of singular historical progression to 
articulate his vision of international peace as emerging through conflict in the present. 
Aristippus was a Socratic philosopher from Cyrene whose hedonism pre-dated Epicurus 
and bears a very different epistemology and ethics from both that of the Epicurians and 
of the Skeptics. The Cyrenaic school emphasized the pathae as central to both 
epistemological and ethical focus and considered objects as having an inapprehensible 
quality. Their movement traversed the Mediterranean well into the Roman age. Sidi al 
Mukhtar al Kunti was a multilingual ethicist writing in 18th century West Africa; his 
philosophy attracted a following across an international landscape as vast as Western 
Europe. He brokered several peace agreements and was known for this in his time. His 
manuscript on diplomacy serves as a poetic watershed for the imaginal and poetic work  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that went into forging his movement and the peaces that it enacted. Central to al Kunti’s 
theory of diplomacy is a theory of mind and of the multiple temporalities of ambitious 
political selves. Lastly the dissertation delves into the temporal and ethical imaginaries 
of Plotinus, Augustine and Sophocles as interludes which serve to illuminate the scene.
Readers: Siba Grovogui, Jane Bennett, Naveeda Khan, Juan Obarrio, Olufemi Taiwo 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Prelude
This dissertation focuses on the issue of temporality and poesis in political ethics. 
It looks to three distinct international movements in political philosophy: the Kantians, 
the Cyrenaics and the Mukhtarians. These movements occupy multiple spaces, and each 
overlaps with broader Mediterranean spaces; hence, they share an interconnection with 
Mediterranean history. The proliferation of each of these movements––through their 
pedagogies and through the poetic imaginaries circulating therein––requires that we 
think ecologically about the entanglements of their respective profusions.
First, each movement––in its overlapping with Mediterranean and international 
life––faces multilinguality and translation. Secondly, to have traction in everyday life, 
each has to engage in the micro-political practices of bodies and the other materialities of 
everyday life. This they accomplish in part by offering alternative tropes of well-being––
ranging from healing to piety, recovery, salvation etc… ––in ways that aestheticize or 
poeticize objects and people in the world and endow them with varying degrees of 
ethicality and value. Third, each at times saddles itself to commercial movements as well 
as to the international poesis of religious symbolisms and peregrinations. Lastly and 
most importantly, each ethical movement is in dialogue with political crises, 
persecutions and the plight of refugees; therefore, each hosts a complex set of 
relationships between the poetics of political ethics and the conveyance of violent 
enactments. 
Since the elements of these entanglements tend to defy singular linear 
temporalities or spatial consistency, the pedagogical proliferations of these ethical 
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philosophies tend to do the same. Just as epidemics are prone to circulate without regard 
to conceptual and social boundaries or to linear temporality and spatial consistency, so 
too each of these ethical movements traverses multiple languages and enters into the 
everyday lives of diverse populations. They, thereby, defy singular trajectories or 
ordered distributions. 
With regard to the question of violence and the mobility of ecological life, each 
ethical movement is required to speak to the cosmopolitan questions of hospitality and 
of the stranger’s right to life as separable from place of origin. It is particularly 
important that we attend to how each movement speaks to this question of the refugee’s 
possibility for life as this is conditioned by the movement’s poesis of time, space and 
ethics. What is clear is that each of these movements draws on a different political 
poetics of space and time, and each with important implications for the conditions in 
which refugees are received. This is due to the great degree of variation in how they 
aestheticize the potential ethicality of dissemblances and embodied differences in the 
world of space and time. It is important to examine these alternatives because they 
reveal the broader international norms and practices that these ethical movements 
become both expressions of and agents for. 
To discern the ecological entanglements of these spaces and the epidemic 
tendencies of a movement’s poetic life requires thinking about their political 
implications, which is to say, thinking about in terms of the force of their temporal and 
spatial poesis. And this likewise requires thinking about the poetic imperatives that 
circulate in today’s International Relations discourses. These manifest as distributions of 
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the potential for violence’s perceived ethicality and do so along certain spatial and 
temporal parameters. When Kantian cosmopolitanism is contrasted with Cyrenaic and 
Mukhtarian cosmopolitanism, what becomes clear is that International Relation’s 
tendency to favor Kantian poesis may not be the most fruitful approach to the challenge 
of peace at present nor to the question of refugees and hospitality. This is because of the 
manner in which the Kantian movement prefigures and normalizes a distribution of 
ethical violence for the purpose of peace. Therefore, examining a more diverse array of 
sensibilities by contrasting three alternative poetic epidemics in the ethicality of relations 
offers new perspectives for evaluating contemporary tendencies in the poesis of 
International Relations and for re-thinking the discipline’s relationship to political ethics 
and to history. What we have to gain from this exercise is a better sense of poetic 
possibility within our discipline, and this by inviting back into the discussion a few 
important voices and movements whose dissemblance from contemporary discourse is 
not so much due to their cultural illegibility, irrelevance or temporal distance so much as 
it is a production of patterns of poetic exclusions that hinge on a set of arbitrary Kantian 
givens about the spatial and temporal imaginary of ethicality in international life.
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I. The Poesis of Kantian Cosmopolitanism and the Reverie of Becoming 
Teleological
Each of us carries in himself the Image of his own world, his Imago mundi, and 
projects it into a more or less coherent universe, which becomes the stage on which his 
destiny is played out. He may not be conscious of it, and to that extent he will experience 
as imposed on himself and on others this world that in fact he himself or others impose on 
themselves. –– Henry Corbin  1
The force of poetics is that images that circulate widely give themselves over to 
more than thought but to ethical imaginaries and to political praxis. Poetics conveys 
imaginal force and bearing in the world. To investigate Kant’s poetics––and not just his 
philosophy––means looking at how Kantian tropes and imaginaries circulate in the 
world and enact visions of and for the world. For a discussion that focuses on Kantian 
imaginaries and enactments, Kantian poetics are not localizable or exclusively 
attributable to Kant’s authorship. Kant is a poetic watershed articulating a set of 
sedimented ambitions for thought and society. This watershed carries virulent imaginal 
strains and has come to speak across many places, times and languages. However, the 
international success of his poetic vision should also be understood in the context of the 
violent enactment through colonization of radical changes to the ecology of the 
poetisphere  and alongside the persistent extinction of languages and of poetic traditions 2
for translating imaginations across languages. Nor are these extinctions unconnected to 
the present mass extinctions underway in our biosphere. The poetisphere is real; it is 
 Henry Corbin (1960) Avicenna and the Visionary Recital. trans. Willard Trask. Princeton University Press, 8.1
 For the origin of the word, although deployed somewhat differently here, see Gaston Bachelard (1969) The 2
Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language and the Cosmos. trans. Daniel Russell. Boston: Beacon Press, 25.
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every word being spoken and its loose connection to the tending-toward-
intersubjectivity of thoughts in imaginal conveyances of force.
Whether in his own time or today, Kant has had many disciples in many 
disciplines such that mapping the force of his imagery and its multiple spawnings across 
these spaces would be absurd. Better would be to provide an example of the reverie that 
Kant’s imagery inspired among his students, one of whom penned this:
How often he moved us to tears, how often he agitated our hearts, how often 
he lifted our minds and feelings from the fetters of selfish eudaimonism to the 
high consciousness of freedom, to unconditional obedience to the law of reason, 
to the exaltation of unselfish duty!3
That Kant’s students were moved in this way, and frequently so, shows that his 
poetics had an immediate and profoundly moving effect on the minds and dispositions 
of his disciples. Social scientists should never forget how much pleasure people take––
academics included––in speaking their truth, as it were, or likewise hearing publicly 
what they feel they always felt. Reverie and pleasure are two words that are not usually 
the first to be associated with Kant. But if Kantian poetics produce these reveries, this is 
in part because the genre of philosophy, within which Kant speaks and which he 
modifies, is for many a site of potential for such a revelrous poetic experience. The 
Socratic practice of elaborating critical wisdom has in many times and spaces been 
where a host of people of different capacities and with different expectations go for 
something they feel they need to say or hear said. In turning to philosophy for insight 
and inspiration, academics may often be more rigorous, but many people in popular 
 Citated in T. H. Irwin (1996) “Kant’s Criticism of Eudaimonism” in Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics: Rethinking 3
Happiness and Duty. Cambridge University Press, 63.
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discourse will readily iterate what they also hold to be a philosophical premise, and 
likewise have an image of what it means to be an idealist. As a preface, therefore, this 
reading of Kant’s poetics situates itself between the lecture halls of his university 
students, his readerships in Germany, and the poetics of political thought that populate 
libraries, media and actions through the continued––and also contested––deployment of 
Kantian poetics, phrases and commentary as these participate in rendering imaginal 
worlds that are likewise spaces for action in the overlapping folds of a poetisphere that 
is also about conveying force and/as ethicality.
Reason’s Bifurcated Distance from the Present World
There will always be more things in a closed, than in an open box. 
–– Gaston Bachelard 4
Of Kant’s elaboration on the relation between reason and the understanding in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Eckart Förster writes, “The concepts through which reason 
produces its unity are the ideas.”  Reason’s role is to “free a concept of the understanding 5
from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience.”  Thus in the first Critique, 6
“Ideas of reason are ‘categories [of relation] extended to the unconditioned’ (A409).”  In 7
Förster’s study of the Opus postumum, he finds reason’s relation to the understanding 
has been completely reversed. Whereas, in the first Critique, “the understanding is the 
 Gaston Bachelard (1994) The Poetics of Space. trans. Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press, 88.4





beginning of reason;”  by the end of his life, Kant felt compelled to “reverse the order of 8
reason and understanding.”  The textual evidence that Förster cites is clear about this. 9
“Reason precedes, with the projection of its forms,” Kant wrote in the last 
fascicle of the Opus postumum (21:15, Op. 222). And in another passage, he states 
explicitly of the faculty of reason: “This is not the logical employment of reason, 
which merely concerns the formal element of knowledge, but is originator of 
itself” (21:106.18-20). Of the ideas of reason Kant now writes: “Ideas precede 
appearances in space and time” (21:88, Op. 252). These are no longer concepts of 
the understanding freed of the limitations of possible experience, but rather are 
representations generated by reason itself: “Ideas are images [Bilder] (intuitions), 
created a priori through pure reason, which, [as] merely subjective thought-
objects and elements of knowledge, precede knowledge of things” (21:51, Op. 
242). This is clearly no longer the doctrine of the first Critique.  10
Förster then outlines why Kant feels compelled to reverse the order of the 
faculties and to posit reason’s primacy over the understanding. Briefly, the Opus 
postumum aims to sketch a metaphysics for the science of physics as distinct from natural 
science (the subject of the first Critique); Kant is confronted with the necessity for a priori 
categories that situate the understanding in reference to a cognition of matter in space as 
opposed to objects in nature.  For this transition to a metaphysics of physics (the study 11






Kant ultimately posits the a priori transcendental idea of ether.  But then he is faced 12
with the recurring problem of a thinking subject whose position is twofold in its relation 
to matter in space––both as self-conscious object under nature and as autonomous 
subject free to posit its own moral duty beyond nature.  Therefore, in order to 13
contemplate matter in space, the problem arises of how to provide for the distinction 
between the inner and the outer facets of the self; here the subject’s intuition of its 
twofold self offers no ground or concept for the subjectively felt distinction of inner and 
outer; ether does not suffice for this. Förster writes:
Where do the concepts ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ come from? And where do such 
concepts as ‘right’, ‘duty’, ‘freedom’, on the one hand, and ‘attraction’, 
‘repulsion’, ‘space occupation’, on the other originate? Do they emerge from the 
conceptual distance between what determines and what is determined? What 
could be meant here by ‘distance’?14
In order to resolve this, Kant is required to posit the primacy of reason’s ideas in 
a reversal of his theory in the first Critique. This ‘distance’ only makes sense for Kant––
since it is internally perceived––as a distance between “two ideas in the production and 
interpretation of which [reason] constitutes itself as theoretical and practical reason, 
 ibid. 88-91. Also in the first Critique, matter appears as a necessary exceptional ground for positing inner 12
sense. “Except for matter we do not even have anything permanent on which, as intuition, we could base the 
concept of substance. And even this permanence is not drawn from outer experience, but is presupposed  a 
priori as necessary condition of all time determination, and hence presupposed also as determinant of inner 
sense, with regard to our own existence, through the existence of external things.” Immanuel Kant (1996) 
Critique of Pure Reason. trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 291. Italics are in the original 
text.
 Förster (2000) 161-213
 ibid. 16214
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respectively.”  The two ideas that are productive of this distance between the subject’s 15
twofold inner and outer dispositions are God and the world.
“The totality of beings is a concept given a priori to reason, arising from the 
consciousness of myself. I must have objects of my thinking and apprehend 
them; otherwise I am unconscious of myself … Reason inevitably creates objects 
for itself. Hence everything that thinks has a God” (21:82f, Op. 248). […]
We can now give a preliminary answer to the question why, in the Opus 
postumum, Kant thinks that pure reason needs to precede the understanding. 
Pure reason needs to precede, we might say, because without its projections, 
thought could take no step into the world––indeed, without reason’s ideal of a 
world, there would not even arise the notion of a sensible outer.16
Kant ultimately conceives of reason’s primacy in terms of the divine 
distanciation of God from the world. And this unfolds just as in the second Critique 
where Kant intuits the idea of freedom as a necessary distanciation of the subject from 
the objectness of its appearance in nature. In the Opus postumum the difference is that 
this transcendental condition appears with a view to explaining the recurrent problem 
from the first Critique––the problem that never goes away of inner and outer dispositions 
within/as the self. Kant’s Opus postumum ultimately posits the primacy of reason’s ideal 
distinction between God and the world as a ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ conceptual 
bifurcation of the idea of limitless force. As qualitatively limitless, God has “only rights 
and no duties”;  as quantitatively limitless, the world is the singular totality of things 17






reading engages with the imaginary by which this distance is made to be felt as present 
for the reader. On the one hand, Kant uses very concise conceptual language in his 
philosophical definition of this ideal distance/distinction: the difference between God 
and the world is ultimately the difference between qualitative force and quantitative 
force. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to poetically explain how the ideal 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative––or likewise the intuited freedom of the 
practical self as determined “to bring forth the highest good through the freedom of the 
will” ––could ever produce the kind of reverie his students experienced such that his 19
purported triumph over “selfish eudaimonism” moved them to tears. If reason’s ground 
is an intuited conceptual distance or bifurcation that is likewise ideally connected and 
interactive through moral and political judgment; the connection of that distance must 
be imagined for it to have any meaning. In short, it must consist or be conveyed through 
the imaginary.
The becoming teleological of the Kantian moral subject is not a simple technical 
distinction between quantitatively forceful world and qualitatively forceful God. Poesis 
attends to more than the definitionalism of moral limitlessness versus voluminous 
limitlessness. Kant deploys an abundance of dramatic imagery to enact a 
characterization of reason’s project in the world through this bifurcation of reason’s 
principle ground. A poetic reading of Kant attends to the dramatic enactment of these 
Kantian distanciations in terms of what they imaginally perform for audiences. In a 
series of theoretical interventions as dramatic enactments through imagery, Kant 
 Immanuel Kant (1993) Critique of Practical Reason trans. Lewis White Beck. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 19
Prentice Hall, 119.
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ethically privileges that subject whose aesthetic appearance is most distanciated from 
the lived present. He does this by rendering an imaginal ground for the most temporally 
distanciated subject––a telos that becomes the ground of an emotively inspiring superior 
moral subject;  this poetically enacted distanciation of moral ground from the lived 
present of nature’s manifold then serves as both the ethical and political link or thread 
connecting the present world with its distant moral end. This imaginal temporal 
configuration of ethicality in the present becomes the ground for imagining the 
possibility of ethicality’s unfolding futurity.
Kantian Syntax, Poetic Folds and Dramatic Enactments
Metaphors summon one another and are more coordinated than sensations, so much 
so that a poetic mind is purely and simply a syntax of metaphors. –– Gaston Bachelard 20
First a poetic reading of Kant would have to focus on his sentences and the 
embeddedness of his claims. The syntactical embeddedness of Kant’s claims often mask 
the boldness of his assertions from plain view while distributing their assertiveness 
across a broader field of thought. For example in his essay, Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Intent first published in the Berlinische Monatsscrift in 1784, Kant 
writes in the explanation of his second thesis that “Reason in a creature is a faculty to 
extend the rules and objectives of the use of all of its powers far beyond natural instinct, 
and it knows no limits to its projects.”  The sentence bears several assertions, the 21
 Gaston Bachelard (1964) The Psychoanalysis of Fire trans. Alan Ross. Boston: Beacon Press, 109.20
 Immanuel Kant (1983) “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” in Perpetual Peace and 21
Other Essays. trans. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 30.
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boldest and most thematic of which is that “reason knows no limits to its projects.” 
However, the syntax of the sentence––the fragmentation and interlacing of its claims––
serves to generate a very different imaginal effect than the bare claim that “reason 
knows no limits.” The syntax effectively deflects reason’s limitlessness onto a broader set 
of tropes: reason’s facultative nature, reason’s project-based orientation, and instinct’s 
(feeble/natural) subordination to reason’s (powerful/virile) dominance. All of these 
outlets diffuse the mythological boldness of the claim that reason knows no limits by 
poeticizing its emotive relevance in terms of both the falsely conceived would-be limits 
of instinct and those limits properly conceived in accordance with reason’s facultative 
role.
By diffusing or redistributing the awing effect of an internal faculty of self-
possessed limitlessness, Kant allows that awe to be dispersed elsewhere––for example 
across the species and out toward its divinely sanctioned end in Kant’s Universal History, 
but also manifest in the present through detached contemplation in the way of the 
philosopher-legislator of Perpetual Peace. And these two aspects of a singular temporal 
trajectory connecting the present with the future enact an aesthetics of intersubjective 
ethicality as performances of detachment from the natural present, but critically this is 
poeticized through highly emotive gendered and racialized motifs. If reason is 
distributed poetically across a field of conceptual backdrops more than it is defined by 
any stable discursive ground other than the internally felt distance between God and the 
world, then the intertextual distances that reason traverses or stretches across are the 
instances of a dramatic movement in the Kantian literature. 
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In the following passage from the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” of the third 
Critique, I have rendered in bold all the words and phrases that point to heights and 
distance as well as the words and expressions that emphasize virility and strength. In 
this essay on poetic folds, emphasis on image over conceptual philosophy helps us 
better understand the drama and reverie with which Kant and his sympathetic 
readerships engage in their perceived “triumph over selfish eudaimonism”.
[C]onsider […] thunderclouds piling up in the sky […], volcanoes with all 
their destructive power [etc…]. Compared to the might of these, our ability to 
resist becomes an insignificant trifle. Yet the sight of them becomes all the more 
attractive the more fearful it is, provided we are in a safe place. And we like to 
call these objects sublime because they raise the soul’s fortitude above its usual 
middle range and allow us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which is 
of a quite different kind, and which gives us the courage to believe that we could 
be a match for nature’s seeming omnipotence.
For although we found our own limitation when we considered the 
immensity of nature and the inadequacy of our ability to adopt a standard 
proportionate to estimating aesthetically the magnitude of nature’s domain, yet 
we also found, in our power of reason, a different and nonsensible standard that 
has this infinity itself under it as a unit; and since in contrast to this standard 
everything in nature is small, we found in our mind a superiority over nature 
itself in its immensity. In the same way, though the irresistibility of nature’s 
might makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical impotence, 
it reveals in us at the same time an ability to judge ourselves independent of 
nature, and reveals in us a superiority over nature that is the basis of a self-
preservation quite different in kind from the one that can be assailed and 
endangered by nature outside us. […] Hence if judging nature aesthetically we 
call it sublime, we do so not because nature arouses fear, but because it calls forth 
our strength (which does not belong to nature within us), to regard as small the 
object of our natural concerns: property, health, and life, and because of this we 
regard nature’s might (to which we are indeed subjected in these natural 
concerns) as yet not having such dominance over us, as persons, that we should 
have to bow to it if our highest principles were at stake and we had to choose 
between upholding or abandoning them. Hence nature is here called sublime 
merely because it elevates our imagination, making it exhibit those cases where 
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the mind can come to feel its own sublimity, which lies in its vocation and 
elevates it even above nature.
This self-estimation loses nothing from the fact that we must find ourselves 
safe in order to feel this exciting liking […]. For here the liking concerns only our 
ability’s vocation, revealed in such cases, insofar as the predisposition to this 
ability is part of our nature, whereas it remains up to us, as our obligation, to 
develop and exercise this ability. […]. 
For what is it that is an object of the highest admiration even to the savage? It 
is a person who is not terrified, not afraid, and hence does not yield to danger 
but promptly sets to work with vigor and full deliberation. Even in a fully 
civilized society there remains this superior esteem for the warrior, except that 
we demand more of him: that he also demonstrate all the virtues of peace –– 
gentleness sympathy, and even appropriate care for his own person –– precisely 
because they reveal to us that his mind cannot be subdued by danger. Hence, 
no matter how much people may dispute when they compare the statesman and 
the general, as to which one deserves the superior respect, an aesthetic judgment 
decides in favor of the general. […].
A person who is actually afraid and finds cause for this in himself because he 
is conscious that with his reprehensible attitude he offends against a might 
whose will is at once irresistible and just is not at all in the frame of mind needed 
to admire divine greatness, which requires that we be attuned to quiet 
contemplation and that our judgment be completely free. Only if he is conscious 
that his attitude is sincere and pleasing to God, will these effects of might serve 
to arouse in him the idea of God’s sublimity, insofar as he recognizes in his own 
attitude a sublimity that conforms to God’s will, and is thereby elevated above 
any fear of such natural effects, which he does not regard as outbursts of God’s 
wrath. […] This alone is what intrinsically distinguishes religion from 
superstition. The latter establishes in the mind not a reverence for the sublime, 
but fear and dread of that being of superior might to whose will terrified person 
finds himself subjected but without holding him in esteem […].
Hence sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, but only in our 
mind, insofar as we can become conscious of our superiority to nature within 
us, and thereby also to nature outside us (as far as it influences us). Whatever 
arouses this feeling in us, and this includes the might of nature that challenges 
our forces, is then (although improperly) called sublime. And it is only by 
presupposing this idea within us, and by referring to it, that we can arrive at the 
idea of the sublimity of that being who arouses deep respect in us, not just be his 
might as demonstrated in nature, but even more by the ability with which we 
!14
have been endowed, to judge nature without fear and to think of our vocation 
as being sublimely above nature.22
If you would forgive such an unseemly long citation, reading at some length 
generates the poetic disposition in which readers encounter the interlacing of images 
within the text. These images are embedded not only syntactically but also in the 
narrative folds of Kant’s conceptual writing. Prior to Kant’s Opus postumum, the third 
Critique is already pressing the idea of God’s sublimity by insisting on the moral 
possibility of “admiring divine greatness”. All of Kant’s moral and aesthetic philosophy 
in the above passage seems folded into another bold and yet dramatized claim: “to 
admire divine greatness requires that our judgment be completely free”––i.e., guided by 
pure reason’s ideal attenuation of the distance between God and world, an attenuation 
aesthetically performed as detachment from present nature––but, problematically 
phenomenologically detached from the present as external present. Here freedom and 
divine greatness go hand in hand with solitude and alienation from the present of 
sensoria, affect and manifold as we must be attuned to “quiet contemplation” in order to 
think of “our vocation as being sublimely above nature”.
When Bachelard says that “all positivity makes the superlative fall back on the 
comparative,”  he is making a simple point. It would be impossible to have any image 23
of the best skier in the world without thinking in terms of other skiers and what they are 
doing. Likewise, superlative moral exceptionality from the natural present is 
 Immanuel Kant (1987) Critique of Judgment. trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 120-1. 22
Italics are in the original text.
 Bachelard (1994) 8923
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unthinkable in terms of a divinely present telos other than by a world populated by other 
morally oriented characters who are cited for their varying degrees of detachment from 
the natural present and for their conformity with an imagined static and totalizing end. 
Completely freeing judgment from nature is an image of superlative exceptionality; 
therefore, it too must fall back on some aesthetic comparisons of the present, and these 
must then also inform the imagination since they are rendered as comparisons in the 
present.
Conceptually, becoming aware of nature’s purposiveness hinges on a temporal 
distinction/distance between present natural spectacle and divinely proscribed end––
one that must be felt internally/imaginally as also connected in the present self. But, in 
the passage above, the Kantian poetic enactment of this teleological temporality in the 
present––in an aesthetic of the sublime––comes through spatial referents to 
topographical distance and stoic virility. The self’s liberation, as the liberation of 
judgment from the present manifold, is a temporal liberation that supposedly uncovers a 
telos of future purpose, but the telos must be poetically located in the present for it to 
have its effect––thus distant purpose as end is imaginally sensed/intuited as the 
presence of purposiveness. This totalizing temporal linearity situates the present as a 
moral trajectory away from itself as present manifold of bodies under the singular 
historical line of totalizing purpose, but this ‘purposiveness’ must necessarily be 
ambiguous and risks, therefore, becoming meaningless––not being emotively and 
ethically moving. The natural impossibility of the aesthetic self’s total liberation from the 
present manifold and relocation into the future end means that this temporal teleological 
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distance must be felt and therefore poeticized in the imaginal present of the manifold. 
Conceptually, this teleological orientation is a maximum temporal distance; however, to 
become internal directive in conformity with a linear trajectory as guided by a dislocated 
end, that end must be made aesthetically present. This linear trajectory is said to be 
reason’s rendering of ethical connection between present and future purpose for 
mankind. But for reason’s dislocation to be emotively forceful in this manner, it must be 
poeticized and given emotive bearing. To resolve the potential for excessive ambiguity 
and meaninglessness for Kant’s readership, judgment’s intuited capacity for liberation 
through the poetics of reason’s temporal bifurcation becomes the stage for inscribing a 
subject’s moral purpose in accordance with a self’s performed poetic dissemblance from 
present ‘nature’ in favor of a radically distant but intuitively present set of images––
images, for example, of martial virility and an elevation of topographical heights––such 
that this temporal construct for ethicality can be felt to offer an emotive, agential and 
political course. 
In order to arrive at the moral objective––“to judge nature without fear and to 
think our vocation as being sublimely above nature”––a host of motifs give readerships a 
sense of what this moral vision means or looks like in the present. The possibilities for 
ethicality are thereby distributed poetically across differing social bodies. The images of 
the warrior, the savage, the statesman, the general, the fully civilized society, God, 
nature, the storm, and, the house of safety. These are enlaced with sensorial imagery of 
elevation, superposition and fortitude. Are these images just flourishes for an otherwise 
sound metaphysical theory of time? Not in the case of Kant’s political imaginary. 
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Without populating a spatial imaginary of the present with some set of poetic figures 
and rendering their conformity to imaginal visions of a distantly future divine order, 
teleological time would be stripped of political import in the present. Or, at the very 
least, Kant’s political ethics would just look like a German rendering of either Plotinus’s 
or Augustine’s theories of bifurcated temporality and of their respective political ethics. 
In other words, with Kant’s teleological poetic characters as they produce progressive 
linear temporality, Kant’s bifurcation of time would end in something like Plotinus’s 
Platonopolis as a political project, or––more likely––end in something like Augustine’s 
political vision of Roman empire’s necessary continuation for the purpose of 
maintaining the temporal conditions for the awaited mass conversion to Augustine’s 
Catholic church. Without the singular linearity of progressive trajectory that Kant’s 
poetics of teleological time to enact imaginally, he would not be able to articulate a 
theory of international constitutionalism.
The telos of nature’s purpose, therefore, must be given presently through imagery 
cast as temporal intuition, and this happens in the way of poeticizing emotively a feeling 
of divine ‘purposiveness’ in the present. In contrast to the temporal concept of telos as 
end or purpose, the divine telos of ethicality’s orientation in the dramatic present is cast 
poetically in the spatial and emotive referents to excessive topographical heights. 
Secondly, ability and vocation for this intuited vista of the world beneath it is rendered 
in terms of virility and a readiness for martyrdom: that “we should [not] have to bow to 
[nature] if our highest principles were at stake” means the idea of martyrdom within is a 
sign that, if given over to the right cause, achieves its moral end in nature. This makes 
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sense for Kant because for him linear time is aestheticized as the accumulation of 
intergenerational toil and hardship.  Hence, Kant is dependent on a state of nature 24
aesthetic which, instead of sovereignty or social contract as morality, endorses––through 
teleological temporality––stoic martyrdom as a poetic imagery of ethicality’s temporal 
continuity. Stoic martyrdom works as an aesthetic of teleological judgment. However, 
stoic martyrdom is also a problem in terms of political agency and singular course of 
history in the present because the stoic martyr lacks a linear continuity as ideally 
presented in the aesthetic of the sublime. Therefore, in Kant’s political writings, 
constitutionalism will provide linear continuity and the stoic martyr as sign will be 
given ethical agency in a linear and progressive sense through a bifurcation that 
accommodates the present’s temporal bifurcation into nation (linear time) and moral-
rational legislative (teleological time). The constitutional order requires the stoic martyr 
take two forms to accommodate two alternative temporalities unified in the 
constitution––the one is the stoic warrior defending the provisional order of the present 
in the forms of nation object of stability across linear time; stoic warriors performances 
of detachment accordingly become a cultural production with often dire consequences 
for the warriors themselves and their families. The second is the monastic philosopher 
charged with rationally legislating the future telos in the present. This form for political 
ethicality as law may acquire multiple poetic possibilities beyond Kant, but the 
performances of detachment on both rational and forceful as agents of moralities along 
alternative temporal scopes endure. Therefore, the poetic aesthicizations of professional 
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classes of juridical, bureaucratic, or intelligentsia––with which Gramsci, Weber and 
Habermas are preoccupied––all can be seen as imbricated likewise in a legislative 
poetics where performances of detachment from the lived present––however superficial 
or culturally hegemonic––are necessitated in accordance with the temporal imaginary of 
public ethicality as rendered through Kantian constitutionalism.
Political Projection of Stoic Anti-Eudaimonism
Dear Monsieur Corbin. Your Avicenna never leaves my table. But with each re-
reading, I see in it more complexity. […] Your book has such importance that I would like 
to study it without ceasing … I believed that then I was touching the poetry of fire. … 
But where are the poems of the Perisian poets? … It is the élan of verticality that I 
received from each page of Terre Céleste. … Reading you, I imagine that I yet could have 
the power to speak of the dynamicity of human verticality. 
–– Gaston Bachelard 25
Poetics forces us to think about what Kantian syntax and imageries enact for his 
readerships and in the world. Reading Kant as a watershed of poetic aspirations enables 
us to think about how the political-philosophical selves of 18th century Europe were 
imaginally primed to either feel what Kant felt in the way of a reverie with regard to his 
ideas, or to feel that his ideas constituted a substantial enough imaginal movement 
among publics that they should be revised. Having begun this presentation of Kantian 
poetics with a review of both the conceptual and dramatic rendering of reason’s intuited 
dislocation from the lived present, the second section then explored the poetic 
production of distance whereby Kant visits ethical privilege on those social bodies 
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whose performances of detachment from the natural present are overdetermined for 
judgment by his aestheticizing of the telos in the present in the form of a totalizing 
purposiveness to which all things properly ethical must be seen to refer to. This 
temporality and the poetics it requires have profound implications for Kantian 
cosmopolitanism.
Distant teleological time and present knowledge of it are two different things. 
Likewise, knowledge of what that telos looks like and knowledge of who and what 
participate agentially in the present’s progression toward that telos are two different 
knowledges. Kant requires signs in the present in order to connect these separate 
knowledges to a universal political ethics in a way that he may not have required in the 
second Critique’s production of a personal moral ethics. Here the reader must have an 
image of the future and of its connection in the present as politically and institutionally 
productive; this must bear a theory of causality or process that is social in a way that 
ethics did not require. In Universal History Kant writes that there may one day be a 
philosopher who becomes the narrator of the human species in its political purpose, 
which is likewise assumed as nature’s highest expression of its own purpose. Kant says 
that philosophy will write “the guiding thread of history” in the way that Newton 
explained Kepler’s laws by means of something universal”.  Yet there is more 26
Newtonian poetics in Kant than this small reference. Kant cannot conceive of natural 
causality other than as linear progression; in this sense, his views on politics are also 
Newtonian in their spatial and temporal imaginary of the present as political process––
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which is to say, as a natural manifold of distinguishably different units with object-like 
stability across time that are likewise beholden to some law that singularly governs 
linear progression. Without this assumption, constitutionality and its perfection 
internationally, as rational political ethics, simply would not work. 
Just as in the present nature, all organs have a purpose; reason’s appearance, like 
that of free will in the second Critique, must have a purpose whose end has not been 
realized since reason wants universals and order but does not have these in the political 
present. Therefore, since all things have a purpose, reason’s must be not yet realized. So 
nature has a divine end, or it would not have given man reason. Conceiving otherwise, 
Kant says, would be akin to seeing nature as engaged in child’s play.  In nature’s divine 27
purpose of temporal teleology, reason is the only conceivable universal cause––hence 
reason is said to be a species-wide phenomenon and, therefore, non-localizable. Reason’s 
political expression, as the generalizing enactment of morality, must be accordingly 
general and universal. This gives law its Kantian form. But Kant requires a state of 
nature aesthetic in order to posit such a law in terms of its dual temporality. In Universal 
History antagonism gives rise to law’s positivity. Law’s rational form requires judgment 
be rational and therefore liberated from the present, and therefore the distribution of 
ethical capacity in the present is accomplished through an aesthetic performances of 
detachment––e.g. the stoic soldier or the monastic philosopher; aesthetic appearances of 
detachment here ground universal generalization of morality––the only proper morality 
imaginable for a public within these temporal confines. 
 ibid.27
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The concept of law thus presupposes permanence as the only proper template for 
reason’s inscription. Since the nations of the present are given as finite object, the form of 
law as temporal permanence is particularly important. Reason’s transcendentally 
assumed universality require’s that law, as reason legislated, take the form of 
universality. In the absence of spatial universality over all political bodies––the entire 
species, law must be legislated to a particular body in the form of the temporally 
universal for that particular––i.e. the form of permanence for that body. Law’s form 
must, therefore, take the following form as equivocal of reason’s form: ‘whatever you, 
nation, become, this law will serve you to the end as your reason is that thread of 
permanence guiding in toward a totalizing ethical purpose.’ Law’s proper template of 
generality is the nation’s temporal persistence––nation as phenomenonally stable object 
and therefore, proper to reason’s vocation. In the absence of a totality of spaces where 
law can inscribe itself in its proper form as assumedly universal in the present, law must 
inscribe itself if the form of temporal universality for some particular object in the 
present, and yet then must also be an experimental positing of its universality. Therefore, 
the subject nation must admit the law’s permanence for itself in its form, but also admit, 
because the full reality of the divine purpose is yet ambiguous, that this law is also 
provisional––a provisional order. 
The Newtonian universal cause here is reason’s manifest purpose as enactment 
of the natural telos intuited imperfectly in the present as nature’s ‘purposiveness’. But 
this ambiguity in the present––this slippage between presently intuited purposiveness 
and agency’s practical need to imagine the present in terms of singular purpose––does 
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not stop Kant from positing the political end in quite clear terms.: the end is the 
achievement of the perfect constitution as “the sole state in which all of humanity’s 
natural capacities can be developed”.  So there may be more to the story of nature’s 28
purpose as unknowable––i.e., more in the way of “development of human capacities,” 
etc… But there is no politics beyond this constitutionally perfected peace of nations. 
There will only just be criminals. The perfect constitution is the end of political history. 
This, then, is the provisional telos in political terms: that it presents the possibility for 
social ethicality in absolute conformity with the Newtonian temporally stable object of 
linear progressive causality. In short, reason must make its will provisionally 
permanent––this form of positive law must be as such, so that we, as a species, can be 
better than what we are. 
This comparison of what we are with what we are meant for is not quantitative 
but rather qualitative. The present progression is Newtonian in linear continuity but the 
grounding universal cause of reason is as removed from the objects as the law of gravity 
appears. The problem is actually more complicated for Kant than for Newton. This is 
because reason is intuited as present in the self in a way that Newtonian gravity is not 
intuited to be present in the objects but rather etherially omnipresent––a given law of 
things. Therefore, reason’s temporal dislocation from the present yet as intuited in the 
present requires some imaginal or poetic rendering of a universal spatial presence in the 
present to perform its illocality as detached purity from the lamentable ethically 
uninspiring present manifold. The species offers Kant the kind of Newtonian 
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distribution of reason illocally that he requires in order to render nature’s purpose 
universally applicable. It likewise offers the possibility for reason’s linear progression in 
the present as a trajectory of the singular manifold––the world. 
Reason’s enacting of singular progression from the singular object-nation to the 
universal whole of constitutional perfection thereby achieves its proper vocation of 
legislative universality across both time and space. Kant imagines that the universal 
cause is reason’s persistent intergenerational effort to which we are morally obliged to 
submit ourselves, but since linear Newtonian process governs the present, Kant’s 
political morality requires rationally stable nation-objects with temporal permanence 
and objectile stability for reason’s progression of political ethicality to enact ethicality in 
the world. Under this temporal imaginary, all efforts for survival that are not reasonable 
in this regard are not properly ethical, but just natural instinct. Kant does not care about 
the survival of the nation or of a family other than in their conformity to provisional 
order as reason’s template for the universal peace. The provisional order is the requisite 
continuity for imagining ethicality’s projection into the future. Peace is just order, order 
maximized. The nation’s constitution, as the form of objectile stability, maintains the 
linear continuity that Kant’s Newtonian vision of ethical process requires––a linear 
continuity from present provisional order to end of history imagined as the only 
conceivable possibility for ethicality’s persistence in what must necessarily––in 
Newtonian form––be maintained in the form of singular projection across space. 
Locality means nothing other than as it contributes to the formation of the ethical 
uniformity of space. 
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However, the species-wide end is qualitatively different from the present. The 
species’s embetterment does not rise like a thermometer. From war we get peace. Just 
like from antagonism we get law. Law needs, therefore, to establish itself internationally 
as end, but also linearly in the present as provisional order. Perfection of 
constitutionality is imagined through a play of internal and external perfection just as 
reason is imagined as thus bifurcated ideally in the self. The internal coherence and 
stability of the nation is the first historical problem to which the progression away from 
state of nature faces; this is because the self in Kant never faced this problem of itself as 
potentially failing to be objectile unit in nature. External perfection of the constitution in 
secondary. Therefore, tor international peace to be contemplated––i.e. to imagine the 
possibility of ethicality in the future of the world––the provisional order as the 
consolidation of coherent national units under the template of constitutionality must be 
enacted. The whole world must be of mutually individuated nations conforming––as 
ground for the possibility of political ethicality to be imagined––to the form of its laws’s 
permanence; this is because otherwise social bodies have no objectile stability across 
time and, therefore, no connection with reason as the thread of universal moral causality. 
The provisional internal orders of nations, as object-templates for reason, are always the 
condition for imagining the possibility of ethicality’s appearance in the future. Hence, 
the present aestheticized concept of a failed state threatens teh possibility of ethicality’s 
futurity in the world. There must always be a present intuition of the telos that is not 
present. In this form, constitutionality is the rendering in objectile permanence that is 
proper to reason’s continued deliberation and enactment. In this form, constitutionality 
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is also the rendering of the provisional order as provisionally moral. Therefore, 
constitutionality is also always exported, as the spatial rendering universal of the 
template of reason for the species. Insofar as the provisional order is yet provisional, it 
may be modified by rational deliberation. However, the requisite condition for 
rationality is at once articulated––since reason is grounded in a temporal distance but 
intuitively enacted across the spatial expanse of the species––as governed by aesthetic 
performances of detachment as ground for political-ethical trust and reliability.
Hospitality, Poetic Force and the Anxiety of Ethicality’s Future
This is where the phenomenological doublet of resonances and repercussions invite 
us to give greater depth to our own existence. In the resonance we hear the poem, in the 
reverberations we speak it, it is our own. The reverberations bring about change in being. 
It is as through the poet’s being were our being. The multiplicity of resonances then 
issues reverberations’ unity of being. Or, to put it more simply, this is an impression that 
all impassioned poetry-lovers know well: the poem possesses us entirely.
––Gaston Bachelard 29
The human species as the vessel of reason’s enactment is the locus for the 
dramatic unfolding of this twofold temporality of causation––manifold, objectile, linear, 
natural causality, on the one hand, versus unified, moral, teleological, purposive 
causality, on the other. The drama of Kantian poetics is to constitute human subjective 
imaginaries in terms whereby teleological time infiltrates linear time through the reverie 
of reason’s intersubjective historical triumph. Poetically Kant must moves readerships to 
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feel future teleological unity in the present, and this occurs along certain gendered, racial, 
civilizational and spatial imaginaries. This temporal bifurcation is continuously being 
poeticized in ways that embody and historicize the human drama and which spatially 
and temporally orient the imaginary of ethical possibility within the lived present. Here, 
the singularity of the future order requires a singular topography of the spatial 
imaginary of the present political order in the form of singular linear progression in the 
present. Exceptionality in the present is aesthetically enacted by imaginings as the 
distribution of potential ethicality across those elements who poetically appear as 
images and custodians of singular order. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
dramatic content of Kantian reverie through the iterations of its temporal bifurcation; 
this means examining, as a poetic reverie, the becoming teleological of this Imago mundi.
From the publishing of Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent in 
1784 to Perpetual Peace’s publication in 1795, the position of Kant as author/narrator 
moves from one of a philosopher issuing Newtonian laws to a philosopher legislating 
constitutions––a philosopher whose authority Kant, writes in Perpetual Peace, should be 
consulted in secret by statesmen more than they consult the people.  Here, the sign––30
poeticizing figures like the shepherd as socially embodied figures––in the present, as it is 
the site of the imaginal of temporal intuition connecting political present to future of 
ethicality’s imagined possibility, is required for Kant in order to exhibit the present’s 
inethicality and to evidence of the need for projection of ethical progress in the present––
the need to modify the provisional order. This temporal tension in the sign poetically 
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distributes imagined agential capacties for ethicality in the world across social bodies 
according as an assumed ethicality of the provisional order as projection for future’s 
ethicality to even be imagined in the present.
These two elements of the present––the species and the provisional order––with 
some degree of tension, coalesce with poetic images in an ethical political enactment of a 
singularity of future in the present. Teleological time, with its singular end, enacts the 
possibility for judgment to evaluate the ethicality of social bodies singularly in terms of 
that end. Therefore, ethical value becomes singular in terms of that end, and the 
singularity of valuation is thus central in the poetic mobilization of the perceived 
historical trajectory and its anticipated distribution of violence. What is valued ethically 
and politically in the present? What is worthy of the future that we can already see? That 
is the question for which provisional constitutional order is posited as a response which 
assumes a distribution of ethically admitted violences over the immanent course to the 
future. But even constitutional order needs to distance itself from the present if it is to 
maintain its form of ethicality. This is Kantian politics in the present. Since the future is 
singular order, then what ever order in the present in the way of provisional order––if 
open to reason’s legislation––must, therefore, contain kernels of futurity that allows us 
to imagine the possibility of universal ethicality. 
Without those characteristics of unsociability […] man would live as an 
Arcadian shepherd, in perfect concord contention and mutual love, and all 
talents would lie eternally dormant in their seed; men docile as the sheep they 
tend would hardly invest their existence with any worth greater than that of 
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cattle; and as to the purpose behind man’s creation, his rational nature, there 
would remain a void.31
With this poorly informed notion that pastoral life is obviously harmonious and 
without strife, it is interesting to pause and consider the temporal complexity of 
intergenerational survival of Arcadian life. Grazing involves multiple temporalities––
seasonal cycles punctuated with weather abnormalities like droughts etc… Grazing 
across intergenerational time on a peninsular economy in the Mediterranean where 
negotiations of mutual protections against starvation from errant drought or other 
events must likewise be entangled socially and politically with coastal economies etc… 
And all of these feature multiple spatialities that are negotiated and can be more or less 
accommodating. When Kant invokes the Arcadian shepherd in a restatement and the 
intuited purposiveness of nature from the third Critique––although here slipping into 
positing “purpose” as such, he says the following in order to justify violence in the 
present and thereby furnish hope that peace must be the purpose of violence.
Antagonism […] is the cause of law-governed order in society. […] Man has a 
propensity for living in society, for in that state he feels himself more than man, 
i.e. feels himself to be more than the development of his natural capacities.  32
Kant bears the same nostalgia for the future as Nietzsche. In spatial and temporal 
terms, their alternative philosophies appear, alongside Hegel, as alternative styles of 
writing but not as any altogether unique strains of poetics. This opening to Kant’s fourth 
thesis in Universal History antagonism––violence––is normalized. Hence, Kantian 
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cosmopolitanism tolerates the Arcadian shepherd in the present but only provisionally 
on the understanding that he is not perceived or imagined as discordant in his ethics of 
contentment with the singular purpose of reason’s guiding linear progression of that 
order towards something altogether qualitatively grander. And yet for whatever 
universal historical cause of Newtonian inspiration, reason, it is imagined, is dislocated 
temporally from the present of manifestation for a species-wide whole assumes 
antagonism as part of the ethical trajectory.
The poetics explain how present value is imagined in terms of its relevance and 
worth in that future. That the future is singular is also critical, because it means that 
judgment may be absolute and permanently so––at least transcendentally we cannot 
rule it out Kant wants us to admit. The outcome is that order in the future––by which 
Kant means single coherent nation-objects not at war mapped on a singular political 
geography––renders the present in terms of  maximum security open only to legislative 
modification. His maxims in Perpetual Peace are recommendations and Kant knows this. 
That is why he says that legislators must consult philosophers but in secret.33
But if you are moved by an altogether different strain of poetics of space and 
time, one that eludes world-linear causal presumptiveness; then intergenerational 
survival takes on very different ethical and political forms of imperatives that are no less 
broad-reaching––i.e., cosmopolitan just less singularizing and tending toward platial 
ecology and multilinguality. To play a game of finger-pointing as to who invented the 
‘savage’ is not really the point. Rather, it is to take hold of poetic figures whose 
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performative spatial role is suppressed from view in the Kantian poetic epidemic and to 
demonstrate a poetic epidemic of political force that is largely enacted across osmotic 
interdisciplinary porosities, porosities that poetically evidence which philosophers are 
irrefutably central to International Relations and which philosophers can only be 
brought in to speak the language of International Relations through great contortions 
and with the production poetically of their marginality upon arrival. To understand this 
requires interrogating the poetic epidemic of ‘international space’ as it is imaginally 
central to International Relations. This epidemic of poesis and its osmotic leveraging of a 
disciplinary ground through inter-disciplinary barriers bears a disciplinary academic 
ground that is also connected through osmotic and porous barriers to public 
justifications and decisions for dealing and distributing violences and as justifications 
these likewise hinge on epidemic imaginaries of ethicality and time. 
Therefore, if Kant tells us that something is unimportant to what he is 
articulating conceptually, a suspicious reader should think of the spatial consequences 
for focusing in on the ethicality as Kant would poetically distribute it away from such a 
spatial configuration as made this object of mention also necessitating that Kant mention 
it. For example, in the long passage cited earlier from the third Critique, the one about 
the experience of the storm and the emotive poetic realization of sublimity’s internality 
as potentially evidencing the internal idea of God’s divine greatness; in this passage 
Kant’s gently and briefly asserts that the internal sensations of the sublime are in no way 
conditioned by the requisite safety of the place from whence the terror is viewed. “This 
self-estimation [of sublimity] loses nothing from the fact that we must find ourselves 
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safe in order to feel this exciting.” Of course, the aesthetic of detachment requires that 
this be noted; and the fact that Kant is not so foolish as to wander about in these kinds of 
storms requires that he mention the house. But Bachelard, a philosopher with a strong 
poetics of place and focus on the lived present, seems to suggest that what Kant is 
experiencing is a projected fantasy about the human that in fact––unbeknownst to 
Kant––stems from the phenomenology of the house: 
The house’s virtues of protection and resistance are transposed into human 
virtues. The house acquires a physical and moral energy of a human body. […] 
Such a house as this invites mankind to heroism of cosmic proportions. It is an 
instrument with which to confront the cosmos. And the metaphysical systems 
according to which man is “cast into the world” might meditate concretely upon 
the house that is cast into the hurricane, defying the anger of heaven itself. Come 
what may the house helps us to say: I will be an inhabitant of the world, in spite 
of the world. The problem is not only one of being, it is also a problem of energy 
and, consequently, of counter-energy.  34
Contrast this with Kant’s distanciation from the house in the passage above from 
the Critique of Judgment where Kant writes, “This self-estimation loses nothing form the 
fact that we must find ourselves safe in order to feel this exciting liking [i.e. sensation of 
the sublime within us] […]. For here the liking concerns only our ability’s vocation, …” 
The cosmic drama for Kant has nothing to do with the house (although Kant is so aware 
of the presence of the house in this scene that he is required to explain it away––albeit 
not very convincingly but the reverie of his sympathetic readership will tend to 
accommodate); rather the drama’s origination is an internal distanciation as present in a 
felt vocation that appears illocalizable vis-à-vis nature or the lived present. Kant’s 
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dependence on the emotive poetics of airy heights requires that the house be of no 
ethical consequent. The ethical import of these two imaginal dramas are in stark 
contrast. Both movements evoke a heroism for mankind’s relation to the cosmos. But 
focusing on the house, as Bachelard does, and admitting its possible centrality to that 
experience of cosmic heroicism puts us in a completely different ethical orientation with 
regard to the present. The most pronounced difference turns on how the possibility for 
ethicality in the world and for inhabitation of the world are aesthetically inter-
connected. Casting the house as irrelevant allows Kant to narrate a freedom from fear 
that is unrelated to the concrete place of its embodied habitation. Ethicality in terms of 
freedom from fear of the present can be focused on the content of inner selves generally 
in terms of those visible signs that detachment. The one whose judgment is “completely 
free” can not be assumed to have his ethical content tethered to a house because it is 
inhering disposition. Ethicality in the world is understood to circulate in terms of stoic 
detachment and this is historically poeticized to allow for historical potency of the the 
Christian martyr, the chivalrous warrior and the detached monk while refusing the kind 
of ethical-historical privilege of women who sabotage oil companies in the Niger Delta 
of Nigeria. The former are figures of a universal ethics; the latter are fighting for a 
particular natural–i.e., not properly ethical––interest. Because Bachelard focuses on the 
house as the concrete habitation of survival, the cosmopoetics of survival through this 
contestation of spatial imagery and its ethicality of the sublime in Bachelared, this opens 
up possibilities for contemplating a whole different poetics of the spatial and temporal 
imaginary and a set of ethical possibilities that will be explored in later chapters through 
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authors of present and place whose thought is yet in no way less cosmopolitan except by 
poetic exclusion of epidemics of the spatial imaginary.
Through these poetic suppressions of cosmic ethicalities emanating from 
ecologies of the platial, the Kantian epidemic of the spatial imagery in these aesthetics of 
judgment sets up the ethicality of judgment’s liberation as teleological. It likewise 
provides constitutionality with its form as linear temporality enacting in the present the 
possibility for political ethicality’s perduration in a Newtonian natural present where 
political change and transformation can only be conceived in terms of linear progression 
of stable political objects. The imaginal ethicality of the political present is inscribed 
through this trajectory toward a futurity that––in order to have political efficacy––must 
be emotively enacted in the present across a set of poeticized and moralized characters 
of gender/racial/civilizational/spatial differences; however, it also enacted, in its 
poetics of singular spatiality and airy topographical heights––the inethicality of place or 
platial ecology, to use an awkward term. For example the place of the house is refused in 
favor of the reverie of infinite generalizable space. These imageries are carried over into 
Kant’s political writings not as poetic flourishes. Without some poetic figures who can 
enact this temporal vision imaginally in the present, time’s bifurcation would not 
produce a political theory of history as linear progression of constitutionally stable 
objects. This is evident in other theorists where time is bifurcated. In the following 
interlude we see that in Plotinus and in Augustine, time’s bifurcation––occurring as they 
do in almost exactly the same manner as Kant’s aesthetic of time in the first Critique––
does not produce a progressional linear teleology of history. The reason is that they 
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poeticize that temporal bifurcation in very different ways. Kant uses these poetic motifs 
as the method of enacting is singular spatial imaginary of peace as remote to the present 
but achievable according to a given aesthetic of ethicality distributed in the present. In 
this regard, Kantian poetics are still epidemic across schools of thought in International 
Relations: A discursive reading of International Relations literature is rife with the 
deployment of categories like ‘Africa’ and ‘the developing world’ whether in theories of 
cosmopolitanism, constructivism, realism or institutionalism. These and other motifs 
often play a critical role in generating spatial and temporal imaginaries that aesthetically 
distribute capacities for political ethicality and political agency in the future. Nor are the 
ethical positions that tend to be endorsed with regard to the provisional order and need 
for objectile linear progression in politics any different from the Kantian spatial and 
temporal imaginary. It is critical, therefore, to point out that Kantian temporality and 
spatiality requires an aesthetic of nature poetics to distributed an absent ethicality that is 
also present but only present as distribution of embodied signs of the moral course 
toward resolution of ethicality’s apparent dislocation from the present. 
The result of this poetic imaginary is the impossibility of thinking modes of 
peace other than through the singular topography of political objects whose objectile 
stability across linear time––individuated and consistently coherent as juridical objects 
ideally subject to the form of law described here––requires reverence toward the 
provisional order of objects insofar as Newtonianly coherent rational templates for 
inscription by universal morality qua order. International relations scholars in large tend 
to adopt this poetic imaginary in their deployments of ‘ontology’––not just professed 
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Kantians but also realists and institutionalists although they modify the objects but not 
the linear progression imaginary or telos. It is no wonder, therefore, that scholars are 
having such a difficult time thinking and theorizing peace other than in hopeful 
teleological terms or in natural ontologically generalizing terms by references to 
systematicity or a singular order. As the nation-object increasingly defies conformity to 
the singular linearity of Kantian order, poetics in International Relations is increasingly 
riddled with references ‘complexes’, ‘multilayeredness’ and ‘regionalism’ as a kind of 
poetics of ontological order conforming to the poetic imaginary that is the Kantian 
epidemic of a singular objectile coherence. The problem is that this fends off the problem 
of ethicality––as the pragma peaceability and meliorism in the present––in favor of a 
hope-inspired teleology of order and linear process that configures the possibility of 
peace in the present only in those terms and therefore rendering the indeterminacy of 
the present pragma, as affair and its loose ontological connection with the future, in favor 
of a pragmatism that insists on inscribing the present with an ontologically singular and 
coherent vision of the future. This ultimately precludes ethical presentism’s relevance for 
the discipline of International Relations as it is poetically constituted and thereby 
precludes its openness to presentist dispositions of peace as internationally relevant not 
in terms of a general theory of a singular peace, but in ways that a poetics of peace and 
supple dispositions poetically articulated could be rendered as central to International 
Relations in a manner that enabled their movement  across places without subjecting 
those places to the totalizing vision of peace as spatially enacted.
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Today, since one can no longer generalize about Africans racially, one might yet 
achieve the same poetic effect drawn off in Kant from his state of nature aesthetic by 
conjuring ‘Africa’ as a continent or ‘the developing world’ as a category of the global 
present’s political qua ethical problem, one requiring singular resolution. The social 
imaginary of these poetic images also fix the political implications: the imagining of a 
possibility for ethicality’s persistence into the future is, likewise, an imagining of the 
distribution of violences that the provisional order might require in order to progress 
linearly towards the not present but more ethical future. But few who speak of 
international society and international law are aware that in Burkina Faso the murder 
rate and other violent crime rates are significantly lower than in Japan or America, and 
these low crime levels come with a fraction of the police budget and prison system.  35
Speaking of ‘Africa’, as a whole, as lacking in law and institutions is deceptive. But these 
images/imaginaries poeticize the present in a manner that is necessary for any vision of 
political time to bear a singular linear progressive course in the present in the way of an 
‘international theory of peace’. These images, thereby, provide the aesthetic contours for 
 “According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 1998 was 0.38 per 100,000 population for 35
Burkina Faso, 1.10 for Japan, and 6.3 for USA. For rape, the rate in 1998 was .24 for Burkina Faso, compared 
with 1.48 for Japan and 34.4 for USA. For robbery, the rate in 1998 was .04 for Burkina Faso, 2.71 for Japan, 
and 165.2 for USA. For aggravated assault, the rate in 1998 was 1.77 for Burkina Faso, 15.40 for Japan, and 
360.5 for USA. For burglary, the rate in 1998 was .17 for Burkina Faso, 187.93 for Japan, and 862.0 for USA.” 
From San Diego State University’s “Crime and Society: a Comparative Criminology of the Tour of the 
World” website: http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/burkina_faso.html , Accessed 
December, 13 2015. These statistics from 1998 were published around the same time when Francis 
Fukuyama published his infamous “End of History” essay in Foreign Affairs in which he actually wrote that 
he does not care at all what crazy political ideas people are thinking up in Burkina Faso. This just a decade 
after the most popular President in all of Africa, President Thomas Sankara, was assassinated in a coup for 
which Bernard Doza in Liberté Confisquée produces documentary evidence that the French government 
assisted and supported. The political gain of his assassination for many stake-holders was evident since 
Thomas Sankara was trying to consolidate African support for refusing to pay African international debts. 
Seven years later all of West Africa was slammed with an imposed 50% devaluation of their currency from 
which the regional economy has yet to recover. And this devaluation was also assisted by the French 
government in consultation with the IMF and the post-Sankara Burkinabé government.
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distributing perceptions of capacity for ethicality as teleological ‘vocation’, but then this 
aesthetic of ‘vocation’ can only be imagined in the form of exceptionality from the world 
present, and in poetically rendering this as such––as both evidence of ethicality’s 
insufficient presence in the present as world, and as evidence of the possibility for 
imagining ethicality’s projection into the future as world future––ethicality’s projection 
into that future can only ever be imagined as world future of the present’s exception. 
Monastic philosopher as social martyr of the ethical future and Arcadian 
shepherd as the object of toleration in the present. This is a fair condensation of Kantian 
hospitality. Additionally, it must be added, the shepherd is ethically disciplinable 
according the threat that a shepherd seeking to spatially aestheticize poeticize or enact 
his vision of ethicality––this in order to survive in a world ethically disposed to the 
multiple temporalities and spatialities that such a life’s requires be politically afforded 
the means of negotiation––would, in Kant’s political morality be manifestly imaginal 
morphing by the shepherd into his alternate, not the premodern by the anti-modern––
the violent savage. Kant’s exceptionalism may not be the only possible poetic rendering 
of exceptionalism available, but his spatial and temporal imaginary lays the ground for 
exceptionalism as such. By imaging the distance between lamentable present and ethical 
future as connected by a singular linear trajectory; this connection likewise becomes the 
stage of violence’s anticipated distribution under anxieties of the possibility for 
ethicality’s projection into the singular future.
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II. First Interlude:
Plotinus and Augustine on the Bifurcation of Time
Time is a garment so be of its fabric   و الدهر اثواب فكن في ثيابه –     
With a day as its cloak it gathers together    كلبسته يوما اخذ و حلق
–– Sidi al Mukhtar al Kunti 36
In his chapter, “Eternity and Time”, Plotinus begins by saying, “Eternity (aion) 
and time (chronos) are two different things, the one belonging to the sphere of nature 
which lasts for ever, the other to becoming and to this manifold.”  As the title suggests, 37
temporality here is bifurcated through the juxtaposition of ‘chronos’ with ‘aion’––literally, 
‘always being’. Plotinus, however, maintains that the literal meaning of aion––‘always 
being’––is misleading; this is because eternity has no past or future but is the persistent 
unity of present life. Therefore ‘always’ is deceptive because it implies a ‘before’ and an 
‘after’; whereas, aion consists in no such progression.  Plotinus’s theory of time is, 38
therefore, radically different from Kant’s. While his description of chronos as a power 
interior to the psyche––i.e. not properly inhering in the world of things––is strikingly 
similar to Kant’s aesthetic of time; yet this all-encompassing temporal alternative in the 
form of aion is radically different from Kant’s telos. The poetic imagery that enacts this 
alternative temporality has important implications for Plotinus's political imaginary as 
 Sidi al Mukhtar ibn Ahmed al Kunti Risalah fi ikhmad al fitan bayn al qaba’il Ms. 13.36
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was the case with Kant. For Kant, freedom is intuited as freedom from present nature of 
object/instinct behavior, and this dislocation demands a distant telos as the only ground 
for an individual to express its moral value through its intuited freedom––the universal 
can only be found in a remote future. But in Plotinus, it is impossible to dislocate the 
individual telos into the future. “Temperance” over “eagerness” is what Plotinus’s 
temporal bifurcation produces as an ethical disposition, and this disposition emanates 
from a very different concept of nature; here nature is life (zôon) connecting the 
temporality of phenomenological progression with the eternity of nature’s effluent 
presence.
Plotinus walks a fine line that Plato did not have to walk because of the challenge 
that Plotinus's Gnostic and Manichean contemporaries posed in their disparaging of the 
material world. Plotinus’s theory and its refusal to espouse these other positions can 
only be understood in reference to his theory of time. The theory of time presented in 
Plotinus is robust and distinct from Plato’s relatively incomplete theory of time in the 
Timaeus and that of Aristotle’s in his Physics.  To understand why Plotinus’s view of the 39
world as imperfect does not lapse into a hylomorphic lament of matter’s baseness 
requires examining the alternative temporal condition of the intelligible realms––aion––
in the context of Plotinus’s presentism of emanation. With this theory of time, Plotinus 
admits that the embodied life is dependent upon the intelligible realm (the noetic), but 
he refuses the position that this world is somehow inherently evil and worthy of sheer 
disregard. The noetic may be dislocated from the temporal in terms of its absolute unity 
 See, for the comparison, Andrew Smith (1996) “Eternity and Time” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. 39
ed. Lloyd Gerson. Cambridge University Press, 196-216.
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and consistency, as given under its temporal mantle of eternity, but this is only a partial 
dislocation. Because the psyche has access to the noetic element of its being. Eternal Being 
is wholly present in the cosmic manifold but psychically apparent as a fragmented 
image of it; thereby nature maintains the imperfect coherence of this life through its 
emanation from the  intellect of eternity.
[Eternity] is something which abides in the same in itself and does not 
change at all but is always in the present, because nothing of it has passed away, 
nor again is there anything to come into being, but that which it is, it is; so that 
eternity is not the substrate but something which, as it were, shines out from the 
substrate itself in respect of what is called its sameness, in speaking about the fact 
that it is not going to be but is already, that it is as it is and not otherwise, for 
what could come to be for it afterwards, which it is not already? […] But one 
must not think that eternity has come to that [intelligible] nature accidently, from 
outside, but it is that nature, and from it and with it.40
The unity of the psyche flows from the intelligible realm and offers an image of 
the cosmos unity within ourselves as intellect’s freedom from pure aesthetic progression 
of time, a feature very akin to Kant’s sublime except that nature is never given in 
teleological terms. But here there is an absolute temporal proximity which precludes the 
possibility of referring nature’s purpose to linear time.
All things exist in something else, and, since there is nothing between, because 
of their closeness to something else in the realm of real being something like an 
imprint and image of that other suddenly appears.  41
Consequently in contrast to the Gnostics and Manicheans, the impurity of 
embodied life is a function of the psyche's temporal excess and not of matter’s 
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incorrigible baseness. The soul’s eagerness to experience its own individuated 
temporality needs to be treated because it is a moral problem. To understand this 
requires looking at his theory of aesthetic progressive time––chronos–– as the temporal 
condition for the psyche's individuation.
Because psyche had an unquiet power, which wanted to keep on transferring 
what it was there [i.e. in the intelligible realm] to something else, it did not want 
the whole to be present to it all together; and, as from a quiet seed the formative 
principle (ho logos), unfolding itself, advances, as it thinks, to largeness, but does 
away with the largeness by division and, instead of keeping its unity in itself, 
squanders (dapanôn)  it outside itself and so goes forward toward a weaker 42
extension (mâkos) .43 44
A seed-like individuation produces a self-unity coagulating  in the body as an 45
elemental presence of an intellectual realm that is fragmented in the production of 
chronological individuations. Yet these individuations are all still connected with the 
presence of the divine realm such as constitutes the temporal continuity of the psyche 
and the intellectual coherence of objects through formal apparitions. But as the condition 
for individuation, chronos came about due the psyche’s “unquiet power (dynamis oukh 
haesukhos)” as manifest from a “quiet seed”. Chronos is the temporal condition for––and 
temporality’s response to––the psyche’s disquiet prodigality.  In the previous passage, the 
psyche takes up chronological time by its power as a kind of natural right to “squander”.
 literally ‘expends’ or ‘uses up’42
 literally ‘distance’ or ‘length’43
 ibid. III 33944
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[Psyche] put itself into time, which it made instead of eternity, and then 
handed over that which came into being as a slave to time, by making the whole 
of it exist in time and encompassing all its ways with time. For since the world of 
sense moves in psyche––there is no other place of it (this universe) than psyche.46
Like Corbin’s Imago mundi, progressive time––chronos––is an image of eternity 
that the psyche, intending this image of eternity for its own self, finds itself enslaved by. 
The soul’s experience began with power and ended in feebleness––in the squandering of 
all-present existence in favor of a continual progression that cannot sustain itself; this is 
the prodigality of a seed that wants to experience each thing separately or differently––
i.e. without its connection to everything else. But in this mode, things can only be 
impermanent. Potinus is presenting the doctrine of entropy. In terms of generative 
nature, Plotinus’s reference to seeds should be seen more as a quantum enactment of 
aggregating forms than akin with the Atomists vision with which he disagrees.  For 47
Plotinus, such a radical emanationist position requires these intelligible forms in order to 
produce an account of the stability of many things in the world in the world. Therefore, 
the world must bear the interlacing of a connection with intellect (nous) so as to produce 
an all-present consistency to the present and likewise of the world’s permanence. In a 
manifold of seed-like multiplicity and temporally individuated potencies that borders 
on a quantum-like emanationism, the stability of things can only be drawn from 
elsewhere. Therefore, elemental forms and other forms upon these will face entropy as 
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alternative modalities come into being; in other words, their ensouled individuated 
experiences of progressive time and its exhaustive nature dictate this entropy.
All the universe is held fast by forms from beginning to end: matter first of 
all by the forms of the elements, and then other forms upon these and then again 
others; so that it is difficult to find matter hidden under so many forms. The 
matter too is a sort of ultimate form.48
Therefore, Plotinus’s objection to Gnostic and Manichean despairing of the 
material world and the body is based on a theory of time that is completely novel. His 
theory of matter comes to mirror his theory of the aggregated psyche as partially 
intellect bearing and partially sense-bearing. There is a plasticity to the psyche, 
therefore––a malleability––since it has this intelligible element in it that is connected 
with the principle of connection itself. Matter becomes an equally plastic reflection of 
this because it bears these same features. Plotinus’s elevation of the intellectual aspect of 
the self becomes the site whereby an image of matter may is celebrated for its absorptive 
capabilities.
We should not in every case despise the undefined or anything of which the 
very idea implies shapelessness, if it is going to offer itself to the principles before 
it and to the best beings. Psyche, for instance, is naturally disposed like this to 
Intellect and Reason; it is shaped by them and brought to a better form. […] The 
matter, too, of the things that came into being is always receiving different forms, 
but the matter of eternal things is always the same and always has the same 
form. With matter here, it is pretty well exactly the other way around; for here it 
is all the things in turn and only one things at each particular time; so nothing 
lasts because one thing pushes out another; so it is not the same for ever. But the 
intelligible matter is all things at once; so it has nothing to change into, for it has 
all things already.  49
 ibid. V 25948
 ibid. II 109-1049
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Matter in the intelligible realm of forms is the substance capable of being all at 
once. Whereas here for things to differentiate and appear different, matter must conceal 
the all-else of its potential; it must become darkness, or dark matter as it were.
Intellect finds out its doubleness, for it divides until it comes to something 
simples which cannot itself be resolved into parts; but as long as it can it 
advances into the depth of body. And the depth of each individual thing is 
matter: so all matter is dark, because the light [in each thing] is the rational 
forming principle. Now intellect too is rational principle. So intellect sees the 
forming principle in each thing and considers that what is under it is dark 
because it lies below the light; just as the eye, which has the form of light, directs 
its gaze at the light and at colors (which are lights) and reports that what lies 
below the colors is dark and material, hidden by the colors. […] That which 
underlies form There is substance, or rather, considered along with the form 
imposed upon it, it makes a whole which is illuminated substance.50
The embodied life came about because the soul wanted its own individuated all. 
It wanted to experience all things differently. Matter’s darkness ‘here’ is just a second-
order effect that is a requisite feature enabling psyche’s temporal individuation; this is 
because since everything exists in the intelligible realm as inseparable and all-being 
without division. Experiencing difference here and one thing at a time requires that all 
the rest––differentiation across forms in matter’s capacity for receptivity––be veiled in 
darkness; otherwise this world disappears into the intelligible all of sameness 
illuminated. The psyche-seed comes into being because it wants it all differently––
without the sameness aspect. Therefore, psyche no longer has access the all sameness of 
being in the intelligible realm, and the dark appearance of matter is the price that it pays 
for its chronological individuation that it enacts on itself.
 ibid. II 114-550
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Therefore together with a life as different, this ‘different’ has a different 
time.51
That we become a slave to this chronological aesthetic temporality in the world––
i.e., that we cannot control its progression as we may like––is because the psychical life 
is always emanating from the essential realm that we no longer properly possess. This 
means that freedom of the intellect for Plotinus is merely the possibility that we all have 
to pursue contemplation of the image of nature’s wholeness. In principle, he posits his 
disagreement with Gnostics and Manicheans by insisting that this world ‘here’ is not to 
be despaired of. The Psyche still has the means to imaginally reach the beautiful unity of 
the cosmos and of nature even if it is as a secondary image and prone to entropy in the 
imagination. Philosophy will help us keep the connection close. Reading how Plotinus 
describes matter in the realm of being as substance that is pure illumination helps 
understand the importance of the imagery in Plotinus’s chapter “On Intelligible Beauty”. 
Sara Rappe calls this passage a “visualization exercise” where Plotinus asks his reader to 
“conceive of the cosmos as transparent”.52
[The gods] see all things, not those to which coming to be belongs, but those 
to which real being belongs, and they see themselves in other things; for all 
things There are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything 
and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for light is transparent to 
light. Each There has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that 
all are everywhere and each and every one is all and the glory is unbounded; for 
each of them is great, because even the small is great; the sun there is is all the 
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stars, and each star is the sun and all the others. A different kind of being stands 
out in each, but in each all are manifest.53
This visualization exercise imagines a fully illuminated cosmos of intelligible 
beings in absolute proximity with this one––emanating through this one. However, the 
divine realm is present in this life but only partially accessible through internal 
contemplation and imaginal work. This temporal refutation of Gnosticism is genius, but 
readers of Plotinus must wonder whether Plotinus was ever totally able to deal with 
matter and the body emotionally––in short, were these philosophical-poet 
contemplations enough? Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus opens by telling us that he 
was a philosopher who “seemed ashamed of being in a body”.  Hadot’s book on 54
Plotinus will provocatively choose to open with this exact problem of his body.  55
Elsewhere in Plotinus’s chapter, “On Matter”, Plotinus refers to matter ‘here’ as “a 
decorated corpse”.  Porphyry’s biography also tells us that he suffered from a bowel 56
sickness but would not give himself medical enemas because he did not feel it was 
dignified. This beautiful philosophy directed at defending the illuminations of this 
plenorum for what it is against the Gnostic and Manichean movement conducts a theory 
of bifurcated time that is philosophically absorbing and novel, but even Plotinus seemed 
to know at times that something more than philosophy was needed. Porphyry came to 
be dogged with thoughts of suicide despite achieving his aim of excelling in philosophy 
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to the level of Plotinus’s choice student. He never told Plotinus of his depression, but 
Plotinus sensed it. Plotinus approached him and told him that the melancholy he was 
suffering from was just a bilious sickness and that he should leave Rome.  In short, Go! 57
See the world! Find a beautiful place! Porphyry left and would never see Plotinus again.
Plotinus had experienced something quite similar on one or two occasions, but 
there are few details in his biography. After Plotinus first began studying philosophy in 
Alexandria at the age of twenty-eight, he wound up in a state of sadness and despair. It 
was relieved only when he found his teacher, Ammonius, with whom he then studied 
for eleven years until the age of thirty-nine. Little is known about Ammonius. But after 
eleven years with Ammonius, Plotinus takes leave, with Ammonius’s blessing, to go to 
Persia and India to meet the great philosophical masters there. In short, Plotinus’s own 
life story seems to suggest that there was something that philosophy as contemplation 
alone could not fulfill. One needed to move in the world even if it was for the sake of 
meeting other philosophers in an ‘over there’ that was more vivid than his ‘there’ of 
eternity’s visualization. What might Plotinus have been thinking when he recognized 
that look of depression from his favorite student and realized that no new teaching that 
he could offer him would cure it? What would it have felt like for Plotinus in his old age 
to know that this philosophy that Porphyry had studied so diligently was not enough 
for him, and that poeticizing and imagining the cosmos could not manage this 
depression? Plotinus too had once needed to go elsewhere and see otherwise. To what 
degree did Plotinus feel he and his teachings were potentially at fault for Porphyry’s 
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state? did he feel like he had fallen short of his master Ammonius who cured his 
depression?  Either way, it suggests that Plotinus felt that his own philosophy was not 
quite enough to cure it. It is unlikely he would have seen Porphyry’s depression as a 
mere coincidence.
The best way to understand why is to look not at Plotinus’s discomfort with his 
body, but also his discomfort in the language of philosophy. And this bears 
consequences for Plotinus’s moral thought. Plotinus appears to occumpy something like 
the position––the between position–– of a translator in the sense that a translator is 
always modifying the language into which he is translating––always grappling with the 
insufficiency of the language to convey the image. Plotinus was a translator of 
philosophy, not out of one language and into another, but rather in the sense of the Latin 
word for translation, conversare, or to turn over. The Latin word translatio––to carry 
across––from whence we derive the Romance understanding of the word translation, 
did not come to have the meaning of translating from one language to another until the 
Middle Ages after Latin and Greek worlds had bifurcated the Mediterranean under 
alternative ecclesiastical orders. Plotinus’s translating from a between space that had to 
modify the language, dialogue and in turn the imaginary; his imagery was intent on  
exposing at once another side of things, an interior of things, an underneath of things––it 
meant turning over or around––con verso. He was always crafting an image rather than 
an axiom because language was not enough as it was.
The wise men of Egypt, I think, also understood this, either by scientific or 
innate knowledge, and when they wished to signify something wisely, did not 
use the forms of letters which follow the order of words and propositions and 
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imitate sounds and enunciations of philosophical statements (axiomata), but by 
drawing images and inscribing in their temples one particular image of each 
particular thing, the manifested the non-discursive of the intelligible world, that 
is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and wisdom and is a subject of 
statements, all together in one, and not discourse (dianoesis) or deliberation 
(bouleusis).58
Plotinus seems to require the poet in his polis as much as his philosophy 
required the poetic image. Even if Plotinus’s political vision was in the form of his 
unrealized philosopher city which he called Platonopolis, it is evident that this may not 
have resembled the polis of Plato’s Republic; it is particularly unlikely that Plotinus 
would have ever seen poets and dramatists as unwelcome in Plotinus’s philosopher 
city.  Likewise, his disciple Porphyry appears to have had a penchant for poetic and 59
religious imagery in his philosophical writings, for which Plotinus publicly 
congratulated him.
At Plato’s feast I, [Porphyry], read a poem, “The Sacred Marriage”; and 
because much in it was expressed in the mysterious and veiled language of 
inspiration someone said, “Porphyry is mad.” But Plotinus said, so as to be heard 
by all, “You have shown yourself at once a poet, philosopher and expounder of 
sacred mysteries.” The rhetorician Diophanes read a defense of Alcibiades in 
Plato’s ‘Symposium’ in which he asserted that a pupil for the sake of advancing 
in the study of virtue should submit himself to the carnal intercourse with his 
master if the master desired it. Plotinus repeatedly started up to leave the 
meeting, but restrained himself, and after the end of the lecture gave me, 
Porphyry, the task of writing a refutation. Diophanes refused to lend me his 
manuscript, and I depended in writing my refutation on my memory of his 
arguments. When I read it before the same assembled hearers I pleased Plotinus 
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so much that he kept on quoting during the meeting [from the Iliad], “So strike 
and be a light to men.”60
The metaphor of the Egyptian iconography as superior to discursive dialogue 
and the image of Plotinus as a translator must also be considered in light of the apparent 
difficulties that Plotinus had with the language. We are told that his spelling was very 
bad, and he struggled in his pronunciation of long words. 
In the meetings of the school he showed an adequate command of language 
and the greatest power of discovering and considering what was relevant to the 
subject at hand, but he made mistakes in certain words: he did not say 
anamimnesketai but anamnesisketai and made slips which he also constantly 
committed in his writing.61
In the philosophical milieus of the third century Greco-Roman world with its 
focus on demonstrative airs and high-flown rhetorical effluence, it is not surprising that 
Plotinus was often considered something of a hack.
People in his own time thought that he was making a show on a basis of 
plagiarism from Numenius, but also that they considered he was a big driveller 
and despised him because they did not understand what he meant.  62
Plotinus's philosophy was never at home in the language of philosophical poetics 
that dominated many circles in the Roman world, and this, in a way, mirrored how he 
never quite felt at ease in a body. The language was always insufficient to the image. 
Discursive thought did not require more precision but rather something to fill it with 
meaning, some inspiration to come into it. 
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He puts things shortly and abounds more in ideas (noaema) than in words; he 
generally expresses himself in a tone of rapt inspiration, and states what he 
himself feels about the matter and not what has been handed down by 
tradition.63
The ‘end’ or telos in Plotinus could not properly be dislocated from the present. It 
is the nature of the discursive that the discursive might fail to achieve the image, but the 
image is always there, always present and possible. Likewise, for the moral end, it is 
always present. All it requires is attentiveness to the internal cultivation of an image of 
the unity in things that mirrors the unity of the eternal from whence all things here 
emanate through nature. Therefore, neither the divine nature coursing through things 
nor the manifold of appearances could properly be understood as oriented in a linear 
fashion. Thinking just in terms of Plotinus’s visualization exercises, these images 
destabilize a vision of things that looks in one direction––seeing forward but not 
backward the chronological self gains its linear orientation from the obscurity that lurks 
behind it and within it. Plotinus’s ethical telos requires vision in panorama in order to 
undo linearity. Likewise, the poetic image undoes the linear confines of discursive 
thought.
The order of the world [i.e. its roundness and central location in the celestial 
sphere] is not the result of following out a train of logical consequences and 
purposive thought; it is before consequential and purposive thinking; for all this 
comes later, reasoning, demonstration and the confidence [produced by them]. 
For since it is a principle, all these follow immediately and just as they do; and in 
this sense it is well said that we should not enquire into the reason why of a 
principle, and of a principle like this, the perfect one, which is the same as the 
goal (telos), is the whole all together and is without deficiency.64
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The goal is already present. And yet what can be understood by Plotinus’s idea 
for a philosopher city? This prolific philosopher wanted to build Platonopolis. Not 
surprisingly, the Emperor in Rome never endorsed the idea. Outside of this political 
ambition, his view of politics bordered on indifference/disdain.  No doubt, he 65
imagined that the political world might be otherwise than it currently had become in 
Rome. His entourage consisted largely of doctors senators and poets, men and women 
alike. As Hadot notes, this was not the all-male Academy in Athens.  But what was the 66
moral political objective that he called Platonopolis? Was it to show people how the 
political could be? Therefore, failing to realize this philosopher city, was Plotinus’s view 
that politics was to be avoided by the philosopher in the same way that Plotinus would 
have avoided the body or discursive language if he could so do?
The best way to proceed in this regard is to give a picture of what law would 
have meant for Plotinus. On the one hand, his contemplative ethics  focused on the 
cosmic unity and the psyche’s transience. On the other hand, his linguistic disposition 
mirrored his emanationist spatial portrayal of nature whereby an image-like inspiration 
grounds itself in the conjured image of the ethical whole infused into thought and 
discourse with a life-unity of imaginally forceful ethicality akin to the seed-like self’s 
chronological power play of inception. What could law have been then for this imagined 
Platonopolis? This question will be picked up shortly after a brief interlude within this 
interlude into Augustine’s philosophical relationship to Plotinus.
 See Plotinus’s interest in diverting his friend Zethus, an Arab doctor, from Zethus’ continued involvement 65
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The Interlude Within
Around 400 CE, before the sack of Rome during the Donatist suppression and 
after the destruction of the pagan shrines in 399 CE in Augustine’s North Africa, Peter 
Brown describes the position of Augustine’s church as ‘peripheral’ to the lives of the vast 
majority of its congregants.  Augustine’s movement had been largely confined to the 67
larger Latinized cities of Hippo and Carthage, but in large across the North African 
landscape, Augustine’s devotees had remained limited to a small segmentary vanguard, 
but things looked differently, as Peter Brown describes, the scene following the pagan 
persecution and the shutting down of Donatist churches. 
There stood another group, the solid, immovable mass of paenitentes, the 
‘penitents’, who had been excluded from communion by the rigorous penitential 
discipline of the African church. They showed no inclination to submit 
themselves again to the high demands of the Christian life.68
Augustine had supported the violent imperial destruction of the Donatist 
church–somewhat problematically regarding his early positions in his writings on the 
power of love. Prior to its disbanding, the Donatists had been the most influential 
church bearing deep roots in Africa with its schismatic tendencies in relation to the 
imperial patriarchies of Constantinople and Rome.  However, Augustine had not been 69
without reservation about forced conversion to his church. On the one hand, his 
opposition to the Donatist church was clear cut rivalry and pursuit of political power. 




On the other hand, he recognized that with the forced conversion of the Donatists and 
their devotees, devotion in his own church would no doubt suffer as these insincere 
converts were forced into it.  He had seen this before under the pagan persecutions. But 70
the core doctrinal disagreement between Augustine and the Donatists is of key 
importance because it reflects a divergence in the metaphysical form of the religious 
“law” as applied politically and poetically in terms of temporality. The anti-hierarchical 
position of the Donatist church saw each church as an autonomous ark or vessel for the 
preservation of the holy law. For Augustine this was misguided and the equivalent of 
settling for the “old Israel”.  71
Augustine drew extensively from Plotinus to construct his metaphysics of ethics 
and politics was Augustine. Augustine––like Plotinus before him and as Kant would 
later––described a temporal bifurcation. But Augustine would differ from Plotinus in his 
earlier work in one critical respect that Brown describes.
In his sermons as in his Confessions, we meet Augustine as the authentic 
follower of Plotinus. Faced by a similar popular view of the religious life among 
his fellow-pagans, Plotinus also had turned inwards. He had insisted that the 
‘ascent’ of the soul was not, crudely, a physical journey from the demon-haunted 
world to the pure light of the Milky Way, but that it involved the realization of 
some latent principle within the inner world. Plotinus, of course, reached a 
diametrically opposite conclusion from Augustine on the nature of this inner 
principle: what for Plotinus was the divine within the soul itself, becomes for 
Augustine, Christ, a principle separate from the soul, a principle, that is, not only 
‘deeper than my inmost being’ but also ‘high above my highest peak’. Both men 
stand out together, against the background of the current of religious ideas of 




Rome, the Christians of Hippo and Carthage could hear any Sunday in the 
sermons of Augustine.72
Therefore, if we consider consider the third century Neoplatonist vision of the 
law of the divine city as opposed to Augustine’s totalizing impersonal law, we get a 
sense for why the Donatist movement would have had such traction in North Africa and 
why, outside of the wealthy Latinized port cities of Carthage and Hippo, Augustine’s 
church had a difficult time establishing itself among the masses. And why even in these 
rich Latin cities the message of Augustine was adopted in a very limited fashion.
The Donatist presentation of the law and the church––its locality and anti-
hierocratic position––can be juxtaposed with the form of law that Augustine is 
communicating for his church––law as both imperial law and the law of a singular 
universal church. The law of the Platonic philosopher and the Donatist had a great deal 
in common; they were the law of city and not of empire. And the best laws were drawn 
from religious practice and communal oikonomos; therefore, the law takes the form of 
an order over a disorder that is revealed to be a vision of health/healing/therapeutic. 
This made sense in Donatist terms. The rural communities in North Africa whose grain 
had for centuries been exported to feed Roman urban centers and military outfits across 
the Mediterranean would have been comfortable with a Donatist vision of Christianity 
that fell in line with an anti-hierocratic locally outfitted understanding of the Christian 
order. Donatist rebellion suggests in the forth century, like the Circumcellions before it 
and, again after Augustine, with the Kharijite movement that spurred the mass defection 
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and break up of the Byzantine empire in North Africa. In short, the Plotinian worldview 
stripped of its vision of the soul’s bifurcation as plenorum in intellect and rendered by 
Augustine as a radical displacement and dislocation of the divine from the temporal 
world, a radical dislocation that Augustine insisted upon but appeared, prior to the sack 
of Rome and even subsequently, to have had limited poetic traction and to have required 
militarized imperial backing for the violent purging of alternative shrines and practice 
from the North African social landscape.
Given Augustine’s marginal political significance until Pope Innocent III’s ethnic 
cleansing of southern France under the longest and most horrific crusade in history, the 
Albigensian Crusade and Innocent’s reimagining of canon law as guided by Augustine 
and instituted by the Clooniac monks through the Investiture controversy with the 
politics of sabotaging European secular rulers, territorial consolidation in what Mark 
Pegg has described as a genocide in southern France in the 13th century;  perhaps the 73
best way to characterize the limited appeal of Augustine’s movement in North Africa, 
and to emphasize the persistent attentiveness to the pathae and to the present as it is 
lived with a possibility for ethical space and healing that the people demanded of their 
public space such that it required that space be imagined other than through a dislocated 
telos, would be to cite Ellen Amster’s research in Fez and the importance there of the 
shrine to al Jilani in Morocco––a saint whose ethics of the purification of the heart bear a 
great deal of similarity with the Plotinian imaginary.
 Mark Gregory Pegg (2008) A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom. Oxford 73
University Press.
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The people repeatedly clashed with the Fez qadi (judge) Muhammad 
al-‘Arabi Burdala over “visiting” al-Jilani. Pilgrims attributed a pillar of the 
Qarawani mosque to al-Jilani and left him offerings there, until the qadi had the 
pillar destroyed in order to prevent “heresy.” Al-Kattani also protested “[al-
Jilani] … never entered Morocco … So how is it possible that it is said he reached 
the city of Fez and worshipped God in some of its places?” […] But the people’s 
prayers ultimately triumphed over scholars and judges in the urban space. The 
people washed themselves at a collecting drain in Tiyaliyyin street asking al-
Jilani for cure, and today there is a grave and shrine for al-Jilani in Fez; there is 
now a grave and prayer-place (khulwa) for his soul to inhabit.74
The Albigensian Crusade of Pope Innocent III was largely directed at practices 
much like these. And it was in this context that Innocent moved the papacy to Lyon and 
founded the University there for the purpose of the study of heresiology. If it was this 
same pope who canonized Augustine as a political and legal theorist, it bears some 
mention that Augustine’s political movement did not survive the fragmentation of the 
Roman empire until Innocent’s genocidal policies in Europe implemented them. 
Plotinus and Augustine lived a very different Rome empires––more different that the 
single century that separated them would suggest. Plotinus’s world one hundred years 
before the empire really started to falter almost could have never imagined the collapse 
that Augustine lived in his lifetime with Rome’s collapse and its refugees pouring into 
North Africa from the shores of Italy and being driven into Augustine’s parishes. 
After the sack of Rome by Alaric, North Africa becomes the destination for a 
huge number of refugees and the power center of the extant Roman empire under. City 
of God is written by Augustine to defend his church against the accusation from a 
 Ellen Amster (2013) Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877-1956. 74
University of Texas Press, 35.
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broadly pagan population of refugees from the Italian peninsula that the 
Christianization and neglect of the old gods is what led to the downfall of Rome as 
vengeance by the gods. Augustine’s earlier version of the faith is modified in City of God 
in an attempt to satisfy all the Roman refugees or significantly change the religious 
landscape of North Africa other than through military force. It seems that Augustine’s 
poetics of time did not have the imaginal traction in North Africa that the scope of his 
political project demanded. He required miracles be part of the faith and saintly shrines; 
this was an about turn and concession to these relics of pagan practice. As Ramsay 
Macmullen shows, saintly miracles become the kind of assimilation of an older 
insistence on healing and religious as therapeutic and focused on the present.  It now 75
makes sense why he does an about turn later in life in his focus on miracles and saintly 
instances of healing. These miracles––and almost all of them are cases of healing––were 
the most important means of conversion in early Christianity. Therefore, Augustine, in 
the absence of a compelling imaginal scope for his temporal bifurcation of ethicality in 
the present world, goes from writing in his early life against saintly miracles to later, in 
the period of his writing City of God, compiling a whole compendium of miraculous 
cases tied to Catholic saints in North Africa.76
Augustine maintained so much of Plotinus’s thought in his own works and yet 
that Augustine casts the moral objective so far afield paints all the more vivid an 
 Ramsay MacMullen (1997) Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Century. Yale University Press.75
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impression of what Plotinus may have seen in the Gnostic movement that he parted 
ways with it, happy to have found the mentorship of Ammonius. Perhaps the best way 
to conclude this interlude within is to offer again Peter Brown’s description of what 
critically appears to have been the one element that summarizes the enitrely radical 
poetic departure of Augustinian time from the philosopher whose thought inspired that 
temporal bifurcation in Augustine to be articulated as such in the first place.
Augustine’s extraordinary capacity to construct from his reading of Neo-
Platonic material an entirely new sense of the inner life of the individual was 
achieved at a cost. He allowed the Platonic sense of the majesty of the cosmos to 
grow pale. Lost in the narrow and ever fascinating labyrinth of his preoccupation 
with the human will […], Augustine turned his back on the mundus, on the 
magical beauty associated with the material universe in later Platonism. That 
‘great city of gods and men’ was a world suffused with spirit and crowded with 
rank upon rank of invisible, loving presences. It remained always on the margin 
of Augustine’s thought. He was, of course, convinced that the order of the 
mundus reminded human beings of the wisdom and power of their Creator. But 
Augustine would never look up at the stars and gaze at the world around him 
with the shudder of religious awe that fell upon Plotinus when he exclaimed ‘pas 
de ho khôros hieros’: ‘All the place is holy’ (as Oedipus had exclaimed at Colonus, 
and as Jacob had done at Bethel: Surely the Lord is in this place. [Gen. 28:16]). 
Plotinus went on to write of the cosmos: ‘and there is nothing in it which is 
without a share of soul.’ Augustine pointedly refused to share this enthusiasm. 
He viewed the Platonic notion of a World Soul, a majestic anima mundi that gave 
life and vividness to the entire realm of nature, as an uninteresting and basically 
unnecessary speculation: if such an entity existed at all, all that mattered was that 
it should not be worshipped instead of God. That was all that needed to be said 
on the matter. Something was lost, in Western Christiandom, by this trenchant 
and seemingly commonsensical judgement.77
 Peter Brown, 50477
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Concluding and Going Forward
What vision of law would Plotinus have intended for Platonopolis in light of his 
presentist temporal lens and emanational spatial imaginary? There was a reason why the 
Emperor never offered to give Plotinus his polis in Campania. There was obviously 
money behind the project we have record of how many rich orphans and wealthy well-
connected people––doctors, poets, and senators––were around Plotinus. And they 
obviously demonstrated a liking for a certain poetic and professional way of life that 
was also challenging in its pursuit of intellectual discourse. Was Platonopolis just a 
frivolous political idea? Or was it a philosopher’s way of looking at something that was 
an old idea and seeing it as the only thing he could imagine would change Rome? Was 
he trying to institute a kind of separation of powers with regards to the empire. 
Separation of power is really the wrong image? Is he trying to dislocate something? 
Iamblichus’––a neo-Platonian contemporary and student of Porphyry––writes, in 
his biography of Pythagoras, 
For cities are only magnified households, so the arrangement of domestic 
concern is the principle of all good order in cities. […] Besides this household 
justice, [Pythagoras] added another and most beautiful kind, the legislative, 
which both orders what to do and what not to do. Legislative justice is more 
beautiful than the judicial kind, resembling medicine which heals the diseased, 
but differs in this that it is preventative, planning the health of the soul from 
afar.78
This imaginary of the law-giver as like a healer is probably similar to how 
Plotinus would have looked at the philosopher city. Hadot has pointed to the centrality 
 Iamblichus (2012) Life of Pythagoras. Nabu Press, 122.78
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of therapeutics and medical knowledge of the body in ancient philosophy.  And 79
Porphyry’s biography suggests that this holds absolutely for Plotinus’s school. Porphyry 
says that when he heard from Eustochius of Plotinus’s death, a snake slithered away as 
Plotinus breathed his last breath. The snake had important connections with the shrines 
of healing and the like. But spatially and imaginally for Iamblichus and likewise for 
Plotinus, laws never really extended beyond the city. They would never enact a future 
development of the world. At best the city became a place for healing in the way that 
Hadot shows how ancient philosophy was connected with the science of spiritual and 
bodily therapies. That Plotinus revered Plato but yet revered the image over the 
discursive in their ability to convey wisdom and beauty means that rather than 
banishing the poet from the republic, Plotinus in all likelihood––even if poetry and 
drama were modified or censured in his republic––there would be no way around the 
fact that Plotinus had opened Plato up to the unapologetic need for the poetic image 
within philosophy.
It would be hard to argue that Epicurus really had the good life down any better 
that Plotinus. He studied philosophy for two decades in Alexandria went to see the 
world and made it to Rome in one piece and, once in Rome, lived in a nice villa until his 
end. He had a masseuse for the most part, but he never indulged in a lavish life. Of 
course Plotinus did not appear attached to any of it. He mostly taught philosophy and 
managed the accounts of orphans it would appear. Did this man want more land for 
more orphans? Or just a more commanding political height for manifesting his 
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philosophy? The political vision of Plotinus is so incomplete. It is difficult to really 
reconstruct a cosmopolitan poetics out of this bifurcation of time and its ethical 
presentism.
A student of Socrates who lived over six hundred years before Plotinus lived a 
similarly pleasurable international life and likewise appeared quite unattached to that 
which he ––unlike Plotinus indulged in regularly in the way of pleasure. Aristppus––as 
he was known––dramatized his relationship to a pleasurable life arguably by embracing 
presentism and in affect and doing away with Plato’s mythology of the Timaeus and 
with Plotinus’s bifurcation of time. His presentism or belief in monochronos appears in 
quite a novel light when compared with Plotinus’s difficulty with his body and with 
words. Aristippus lives a very different sort of presentism than the Plotinian one. One an 
openness to indulgence, but his commitment to pleasure was not in a gross or 
philosophically facile manner. The Cyrenaic hedonism of Aristippus and his followers 
focused more on the plasticity of the present and of the indeterminate possibility for 
pleasure interlaves within the present––not as objects in the manifold of nature’s 
presence as field––but as the pragma of lived-present affective elements––“the enacting 
elements of pleasure” (ta poiaetika taes haedonaes).
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III. The Poesis of Cyrenaic Cosmopolitanism and the Reverie of Presentism
Eternity is a child playing games Αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων πεσσεύων
The kingdom of a child παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη 
–– Heraclitus 80
Aristippus’s Cyrenaic school of philosophy is never mentioned in genealogies of 
cosmopolitanism. That says more about the conceptual horizons of what a theory of 
cosmopolitanism is expected to look like today than it says about the expansiveness of 
cosmopolitan dispositions and practices as overlap with the pursuit of discursive 
wisdom. In Lives of Eminent Philosophers, by Diogenes Laertius, the term ‘citizen of the 
cosmos’ or similar such phrases like ‘my fatherland is the cosmos’ are so frequently used 
that consolidating this concept to an original politics of Cynic and Stoic thought 
exclusively is fraught. The term circulated so widely among philosophers that it appears 
more to have been a kind of catch-phrase qua disposition that many philosophers––if 
they were worthy of the title––would have deployed in their perambulations of 
Mediterranean space. A phrase like this lends international access to a variety of 
pedagogical spaces while likewise insisting on a role for wisdom and its field of inquiry 
as transcending political frontiers in its usefulness for all. Likewise, it presents and 
image of wisdom as potentially irreducible to the political as particular. It was in fact a 
pedagogical statement more than a political one, but one with political implications that 
should not be dismissed. Vitruvius’s De Architectura tells the story of Aristippus being 
shipwrecked.
 Heraclitus (2003) Fragments. New York: Penguin, 60. My translation.80
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It is related of the Socratic philosopher Aristippus that, being shipwrecked 
and cast ashore on the coast of Rhodians, he observed geometrical figures drawn 
thereon, and cried out to his companions: “Let us be of good cheer, for I see the 
traces of man.” With that he made for the city of Rhodes, and went straight to the 
gymnasium. There he fell to discussing philosophical subjects, and presents were 
bestowed upon him, so that he could not only fit himself out, but could also 
provide those who accompanied him with clothing and all other necessesaries of 
life. When his companions wished to return to their country, and asked him what 
message he wished them to carry home, he bade them say this: that children 
ought to be provided with property and resources of a kind that could swim with 
them even out of a shipwreck. […] The man of learning is the only person in the 
world who is neither a stranger in a foreign land, nor friendless when he has lost 
his intimates and relatives; on the contrary, he is a citizen of every country.81
For Aristippus, wisdom is inseparable from a cosmopolitan self, and a 
cosmopolitan self the only true test of wisdom’s presence. Trials of strangeness and 
newness in the world of experience are a test of whether situations can be manipulate or 
managed through dialogic engagement with the indeterminacy of the present affair––no 
matter how foreign–– and this for the sake of making it enjoyable. Three saying of 
Aristippus's point to this. When Aristippus was asked what he had gained from 
philosophy he says, “the ability to be feel at ease in any society.”  Secondly, he was 82
asked what distinguished the wise from the unwise and he said, “Strip them both naked 
and send them among strangers (agnôn) and you will know.”  Lastly, when asked what 83
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advantage philosophers have he responds, “Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on 
living as we do now.”84
Why have genealogies of cosmopolitanism not cared about the Cyrenaics? 
Probably because the Cyrenaics are labelled as hedonists, and, therefore, political and 
philosophical treatments of Epicurus are assumed to cover any of the earlier hedonist 
movements. That is what Kant seemed to presume in his straw-man refutation of 
Epicurianism as the only hedonist doctrine presented in his texts. An alternative 
hypothesis is that hedonism could not possibly form any stable ground for considering 
politics at an international level and, therefore, is quite limited in scope. This chapter 
pushes against this by focusing on epistemology and pedagogy. It is argued that the 
question of cosmopolitan ethics and of its possibility in the world is neither an isolated 
field of inquiry nor epistemologically stable. As political, however, the cosmopolitan 
question is inextricable from questions of ethics in politics. Furthermore, International 
Relations’ infatuation with ontology always raises epistemological questions in the 
arguing of that ontology, which epistemological questions tend to fall back on an 
account of the ethical content of politics. Therefore, most International Relations 
theorists, except the most dogmatic American exceptionalists perhaps, consider their 
theories to be helpful in facilitating good political outcomes across polities in relation. 
Our canonical realist authors––e.g., Waltz and Morganthau––justify their realism in 
terms whereby admitting war serves to reduce its probability and magnitude. In short, 
most International Relations scholars are in some aspect of their thought contemplating 
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the cosmopolitan question. But politics is taught. And before that absorbed or, at times, 
inherited. Politics has a poetic life in pedagogy that cannot be written out of 
epistemological concerns.
   
Hedonic Indeterminacy and Epistemology of the Affective Present
ὃ δὴ περιγίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀδιαφορησασι περὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς
–– Hegesias the Cyrenaic 85
In light of our over-familiarity with Epicurus’s rational––and arguably quite 
stoicized––hedonism and with Stoic cosmopolitanism, it is important to investigate 
Cyrenaic hedonism in more detail lest we allow ourselves to think that Epicurus covers 
all hedonist possibilities. Another reason is that Cyrenaic philosophy’s epidemic 
pervasiveness––spanning centuries and moving across continents in the 
Mediterranean––is only now coming into clarity.  Therefore, examining Cyrenaic 86
thought, as it appears to have been poetically trenchant across spaces and 
cosmopolitically oriented, may upset the straw-man of Kant’s Epicurus and this in ways 
that are helpful for looking at the poesis of temporality and ethics. Lastly, Cyrenaic 
epistemology may likewise pose fruitful alternatives to the simple relativisms of 
Sociological thought that are epidemic in International Relations’ deployment of 
concepts like ‘culture’ ‘society’ and ‘norms’ in ways that tend to fall back on notions of a 
 DL I 22485
 Kurt Lampe (2015) The Birth of Hedonism. Princeton University Press; Ugo Zilioli (2012) The Cyrenaics. 86
Durham, UK: Acumen Publishing.
!68
bounded objectilely stable community as the assumed starting point for political 
ontologies of stability––the likes of which Durkheim and other republicanist sociologists 
have instilled and which now appear so ill-equipped for sorting through the social 
problems of the present and the possibilities for peaceability inhering therein; they 
appear ill-equipped largely because these theories always appear––like Durkheim before 
them––more interested in performing––through their unitary objectile gaze––the 
possibility of coherent units and thereby address their universalizing theories to an 
oddly ethnicizing political project of spatially uniformity and temporal consistency for 
the political as field of objects. An investigation into an earlier vision of hedonism, such 
as that of the Cyrenaic school, permits us to explore alternative poetic possibilities 
within political philosophy, other than the ones pedagogically handed down to us. It 
may, therefore, assist us in imaging the temporality and the spatiality of ethics in 
international relations in a manner that admits the importance of peoples’ interest in 
pleasure and in ways that do not pathologize pleasure but instead focus on its 
indeterminacy through an admission of the present’s loose ontological connection with 
the future. In short, to admit something of a presentism that is not contextualized but 
poeticized. 
The Cyrenaics draw an important distinction in their departure from Pyrrhonian 
skepticism. For the Cyrenaics, the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s position that knowledge is 
impossible is itself a dogma. The citations from Aristippus on the importance of wisdom 
and pedagogy would not hold unless the possibility of augmenting one’s knowledge 
through inquiry were possible. Cyrenaics draw a sharp distinction from the Skeptics in 
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order to depart from the threat of this dogmatism present in the Skeptics’ reduction of 
the world to a solipsistic impossibility of knowledge about it. Voula Tsouna relates 
Sextus' depiction of the difference between the Skeptics and the Cyrenaics as follows. 
Whereas “[the Skeptics’] aim was not to suspend judgment about what is known and to 
keep searching for truth, but to pronounce objective truth unreachable; [the Cyrenaics] 
‘suspend judgment about external objects, as far as the arguments go [but] declare these 
objects have an inapprehensible nature’ (Sextus, PH I.215 [T6a]).”  Thus the Cyrenaics 87
conceive of an epistemology whose tone is strikingly similar to that of Kant’s First 
Critique where skepticism is admitted and the inapprehensible  interiority of things 88
becomes the site for discursive inquiry and the possibility of knowledge. The important 
imaginal difference is in the Cyrenaic refusal to pathologize pleasure and, secondly, in 
their ethical insistence on presentism through their temporal concept of monochronos 
discussed later.
Tsouna goes on to conclude that “The Cyrenaics could recommend themselves as 
Socratics on the grounds that they explored further the requirements for an objection-
free definition of knowledge and came to realize that, in order to secure it, they must 
redefine knowledge in terms of awareness of internal states.”  Likewise, Ugo Zilioli 89
recommends that we read the Cyrenaics as the most authentic continuation of the 
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Socratic tradition against Plato’s derivative cooptation of the Socratic voice.  That being 90
said, the question of Socratic authenticity is not relevant here. Rather distinguishing 
Cyrenaics’ own philosophical differences from the schools that dominate in our 
recollections of the major philosophical schools in antiquity, and in particular Epicurian 
and Stoic thought with which the Cyrenaics differed in subtle but important ways.
In her juxtaposition of the foundationalist assumptions of Epicurus and Stoicism 
with Cyrenaic epistemology and its alternative to Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Tsouna writes, 
“the Epicurean and Stoic theses concerning the criterion presuppose a systematic 
correlation between the truth of the criterion and the reality of what it reports.”  91
Epicurus’s epistemology relates the criterion for judging knowledge to the instrument of 
measurement––the ruler––in the examination of objects of apparition in the world.
Sensations (aestheseis), preconceptions (prolepseis), undergoings or affections 
(pathe), and, in later Epicureansim, mental impressions (phantastikai epibolai tes 
dianoias) qualify as criteria primarily because they provide the means by which 
further evidence can be tested. The analogy of the ruler illustrates a main 
epistemic function of the Epicurean criteria: their application to things which are 
not immediately and directly observable augments our knowledge about these 
non-evident things, just as the application of the standard ruler to unknown 
lengths increases our knowledge about those lengths.92
By contrast, Stoic foundationalist epistemology invokes a different notion of the 
criteria by which objective knowledge is purported.
Provided that one perceives an external object in a clear and distinct way, one 





primary criterial function of the cognitive impression is not to test things other 
than itself, but to establish its own content as true of the object which the 
cognitive impression exactly represents. While Epicurus considered that the 
knowledge provided through the use of the criteria is primarily inferential 
knowledge about things other than the criteria themselves, the Stoics identified 
knowledge through the criterion as immediate, non-inferential knowledge. One’s 
knowledge about the world does gradually grow, not because the criterion is 
applied to non-evident states of affairs, but because one receives an increasing 
number of propositions as true. (Notice the foundationalist assumptions 
involved in both the Epicurean and in Stoic criteria).93
But if the Pyrrhonian skeptics acknowledge the pathae as the criterion ‘whereby 
hunger leads us to food and thirst to drink’ , then what is the epistemological 94
connection for the Cyrenaics between the pathae that we undoubtedly experience and the 
possibility of acquiring knowledge which the Cyrenaics insist on despite the internality 
of pathaec experience? Or as Tsouna puts it, “What is the connection between one’s 
feeling of pain and the awareness that one is cut?”  On the one hand, the pathae are 95
described by Arete’s pupil, the Metrodidact, as varying like the motions of the sea. Pain 
is a rough internal motion resembling “a storm at sea”; Pleasure “is similar to smooth 
sea waves”; lastly the intermediate condition––two which we are indifferent, because 
neither pleasurable or painful but yet aware of––is “like a calm sea”.  Diogenes 96
Laertius’ doxography of the Cyrenaics defines “pleasure as ‘the smooth  movement that 







clear distinction between the physical movement and one’s consciousness of it.”  In 98
short, there is a poetics of affective imagery coupled with a reflexive moment of self-
consciousness of the world of objects and people as affecting the internal pathae.  And 99
this occurs with the possibility for discursive knowledge to be procured by experience 
and pedagogy, but such knowledge is not directed at a eudaimonist good-life of 
happiness because happiness is an abstraction. The self is interested in experiences as 
such and not an abstract aggregation of experiences. This distinction is key to 
understanding Cyrenaic disagreement with the idea of Epicurean thought that postcedes 
Cyrenaic hedonism with the rise of imperial Rome.
Cyrenaics begin with a very similar epistemology as Kant; however, because they 
do not take up any of the Kantian Enlightenment imagery, the Cyrenaics end up 
dramatizing a highly presentist ethics that uses the indeterminacy of pleasure’s 
subjectivity to highlight the plasticity of the self-in-the-world as a shared present, or to 
use their language, a ‘pragma’ as affair of the apparently shared but discursively 
manipulable present.
The Agora of Bodies in Politics
The basic conceptual theme for Cyrenaic presentism and its disavowal of abstract 
happiness as an ethical end is the term monochronos––literally singular time. How to best 
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translate this term is somewhat disputed among scholars of Cyrenaic thought. Tsouna 
argues that monochronos is best understood in terms of the limited longevity of a given 
pleasurable or painful experience.  This monochronality, as it were, is central to 100
understanding the Cyrenaic refutation of abstract happiness in life because the Cyrenaic 
position is that memories of past pleasure or pain or the anticipation of future pleasure 
or pain is not really constitutive of what humans aim for in life. Rather, the experience as 
lived pathae is what people are interested in either enacting in the case of pleasure or 
avoiding in the case of pain. The epistemological conundrum, however, is that pleasure 
is ultimately subjective but also fairly indeterminate, but this apparent epistemological 
limit can be seen as likewise authoring a political opportunity. Here the Cyrenaics do 
take an important position in contrast to Epicurus. They argue that bodily pains are far 
more of an ethical deterrent than mental pains, the latter being what Epicurus maintains 
that the wise will avoid above all and that the wise are indifferent to pains of the body.
Epicurus, therefore, configures quite an odd refutation of the Cyrenaic position. 
On one hand, the Epicureans take eudaimonia––conventionally translated as happiness––
as the goal. On the other hand, the unknowability of outcomes in life that can secure a 
set of pleasureable experiences means that happiness cannot properly be objectively 
possible through securing pleasurable experiences and must therefore be imagined in 
terms of absence of pain. What is more, Epicurus claimed that mental pains were more 
upsetting than bodily pains. Oddly and in contrast to the connotation intended by the 
modern term Epicurean, the doxography of Epicurus has him arguing for little in the 
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way of sensual enjoyment. As a justification for the premise that mental pains are greater 
than physical pains, Epicurus’s imaginary of the wise philosopher as ethical 
embodiment in its poetic course is strikingly Stoic when compared with the Cyrenaics. 
Epicurus writes, “Even on the rack the wise man is happy […] When on the rack, 
however, he will give vent to cries and groans.”101
To understand the Epicurean position and its departure from that of the 
Cyrenaics requires focusing on there alternative temporal understandings of the self. 
Central, therefore, to Epicurean notions of pleasure is the notion rejected by Cyrenaics 
that memories are perdurations and extend pain and pleasure out across the broader 
entirety of a life’s existence. Mental pains, in contrast to bodily pains, are far worse for 
Epicurus, for “the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the 
past and future as well as the present. In this way he holds mental pleasures to be 
greater than those of the body.”  This is appears to be the philosophy of a man who is 102
quite attached to his reputation perhaps and prone to experience quite acutely 
something like shame or humiliation as a potentially life-ruining mental anxiety. Hence, 
for the wise, the rack is not an object of concern and deliberation. This position has 
potentially frightening social consequences. 
The point that can be drawn from Epicurus’ temporality of the self and his 
referral of hedonist doctrine to a flight from pain––in particular mental shame and 
regret––over the pursuit of pleasure where pain and pleasure are properly understood to 
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be more severe in the case of mental pain is the following. The Epicurean movement in 
this respect really admits an entirely stoic rendering of hedonism. Here the sight of 
philosophical debate between the two great schools of the Roman imperial period––
Epicurean and Stoic––appear to both share the obsession with the philosopher as an 
embodied portrait of an abstract configuration of a good life that is more stoic in its 
temporality than anything the Cyrenaic would recognize as coherently hedonist. Reason 
becomes, for Epicurus, the means to detachment from the present towards cultivating an 
attentive thwarting of mental anguish and reminiscence. The ethical image of the 
philosopher thereby becomes that of a life lived in totality, and the site of public 
portraitures of ethicality become the philosopher’s embodied reflection on his self-
image. 
By Epicurus’s time, the space of philosophy has been reconfigured away from the 
earlier Mediterranean agora of Cyrenaic-Cynic-Skeptic sparring that the early Cyrenaics 
inhabited. No longer is this a dramatic and dialogic enactment in the public agora where 
things and bodies circulate in a space of acute proximity with the present world of 
political commercial and embodied life. Epicurus, we are told, considered “the dialectic 
as distracting”.  Epicurus is inhabiting a stoicized space of detached philosophy at a 103
time when philosophical schools are setting themselves in ideal––and often exclusive 
and state subsidized––communities of adherents that were insulated from the vagaries 
of divergent philosophical quippings and public performances where radical 
contestation was often the norm and wide ranging opinions circulated in dialogical 
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dramatics. When reading the Epicurean ethical doxography, in contrast to Cyrenaics, it is 
striking how similar the Epicurean philosopher’s public persona is to the Kantian one. 
The ethical opposition of Stoic with Epicurean is commonly taken as hinging on their 
differing view of pleasure. But if we look at the spatial, temporal and ethical imaginaries 
of philosophy’s public import, as it is being performed through these two schools, there 
is not a terribly trenchant divergence between Epicurus and Stoicism. It is more of an 
academic debate of analytics than an ethically charges divergence on questions of public 
morality. Both insist on the cultivation of this image of wisdom and public ethics as a 
performance of detachment from the embodied experience of the present in favor of an 
abstract rendering of a discursively over-determined stoic ethic of propounded 
indifference on the part of the wise to the present.
Monochronos on the part of the Cyrenaics represents a hedonist alternative that is 
opposed to stoicizing self-reflection. So what are the consequences of such a temporal 
imaginary for the self as it is likely to be prone, at times, to painful and delightful 
memories and concerns for reputation? In Zilioli’s reconstruction of the Cyrenaic 
philosophy of subjectivity, he uses the term, ‘loose self’ to refer to the coherence or 
persistence of subjectivity across time while at the same time accounting for this self as 
one that cannot be so coherent as to become the object of proper ethical pursuits. This 
‘loosely’ aggregated self bridges the ethical disposition of monochronality as attention to 
the experience of the moment as experience with the possibility for accumulating 
knowledge and the cultivation of an ethical disposition that traverses the momentary. 
Zilioli offers the following description.
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In the Cyrenaic world, both objects and persons are best interpreted as 
bundles of some episodic and temporary features. Since they are not equipped 
with a stable ontological essence, objects and persons are best thought of as being 
under perennial change and as moving from one episode of their fragmented life 
to the subsequent one with no possible interruption. Objects and persons are, for 
Cyrenaics, aggregates immersed in a perennial process of transformation and 
modification.104
For the metaphysics of process over a metaphysics of objects which this theory 
implies, monochronality becomes an essential element in the centrality of affective 
process. For Zilioli, like Tsouna, monochronos “aims to convey the idea that each pathos 
lasts only for the time in which it is actually felt. This means [from] an encounter 
between the subject feeling the affection and something else causing the affection. When 
one of the two poles of the relationship breaks away, the affection perishes.”  However, 105
Voula Tsouna, Ugo Zilioli and Kurt Lampe all argue in their own way that despite the 
Cyrenaic emphasis on bodily pleasures and pains over mental ones; they do not discard 
the relevance of mental aspects in the experience of bodily pleasure.  Zilioli gives us 106
the following account.
The loose subject experiences the pleasure of the present and makes it the 
goal of its life. The pleasure of the present is bodily, in so far as for the Cyrenaics 
each and every pleasure begins with an alteration of the body. […]
The psychological connectedness I attribute to the Cyrenaic loose subject is 
ultimately responsible for the production and elaboration of those extra-affective, 
belief-related activities that influence the actual way in which we experience 
pleasure. […]
According to Diogenes, the Cyrenaics conceive of happiness as “a collection 
made out of particular pleasures. Among these both past and future pleasures 
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are counted together” […] [H]appiness cannot be properly regarded as the end, 
since that would presuppose an idea of life as a single and determinate item, 
such as the one that is implied in, for instance, Aristotle’s eudaimonist ethics.”107
In a compelling revisiting of Plato’s and Aristotle’s refutation of hedonism and 
its ethical object as pleasure, Zilioli points to the passage from the Philebus where 
Socrates is quoted as saying, “Have we not been told that pleasure is always a process of 
becoming, and that there is no being at all of pleasure? There are some subtler thinkers 
who have tried to pass on this doctrine to us, and we ought to be grateful to them.”  108
Zilioli argues that Plato’s Socrates here––and in the Thaetetus more so––is in fact 
presenting Cyrenaic thought under the term ‘the subtler thinkers’.  Zilioli ascertains 109
Socrates’s potential endorsement of the Cyrenaic position on pleasure, an endorsement 
that Plato’s reconstruction of the dialogues does not totally overwrite.  The rhetorical 110
rearticulation of pleasure’s non-being, in Plato’s account of Socrates’s position, is enough 
for Plato and Aristotle to refute pleasure’s ethical status; for Plato and Aristotle, the fact 
that pleasure is mere becoming is enough to dismiss it as a viable ground for ethical 
thought and the reason is that their vision of the unitary abstract image of a 
philosophical life as ethical life that enables this dismissal. “Both Plato in the Philebus 
and Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics are concentrating on what mostly matters in 






essences: of what is just in virtue of itself and not in relation to any other thing.”  But 111
Zilioli speculates that Socrates’s position on the matter was likely to have been more 
open to that of the Cyrenaics. Recall Tsouna held a similar opinion on the issue of 
epistemology.
Lampe’s reconstruction of Cyrenaic thought proposes no such connection 
between the Cyrenaics and the “subtler thinkers” of Plato’s Socrates, but his treatment of 
Cyrenaic presentism is broadly similar to Zilioli’s reconstruction. However, Lampe 
focuses more on the indeterminacy of the present as pragma and as the site for creative 
malleability. Perhaps, we might say that, for Lampe, Cyrenaic presentism falls back on 
an economy of psychic energy.  While Cyrenaics insist on the pragma––or affair––of 112
the present, they do not dismiss that future concerns are of no import. In fact, the core 
distinction between the Cyrenaics and the Pyrrhonian skeptics, as we saw earlier, relates 
to the former’s position that philosophy and learning are productive. But the dilemma 
that requires explanation then is how do we reconcile that with the presentism of their 
ethics. Kempe puts it in terms of the language of philosophical conversion: if the 
Cyrenaics are intent on maintaining that the present is all that should concern us, why is 
anyone ever tempted to modify their pursuits in favor of a beneficial philosophical 
knowledge-acquiring pursuit. Of course, it is clear from all the anecdotes about 
Aristippus’ life that conversation and the dialogic drama of philosophy is quite fun. 
Kempe says something similar but attends to the temporal dilemma. Cyrenaics are 
 ibid. 165-6111
 Lampe mentions oikonomia in this regard, 83112
!80
interested in happiness he argues but only indirectly in so far as it may be viewed as an 
aggregation of many pleasurable and few painful experiences. But the ethics of 
presentism mean that “Happiness is the unintended consequence”  of the way in which 113
the wise pursue pleasure in the present. And with regard to conversion to the philosophical 
life, Lampe proposes the following:
For example, let us imagine that Anniceris’s future student Posidonius has 
experienced tremendous disappointment in his home polis before coming to 
Cyrene as an exile.  Perhaps members of his political faction were even 114
disposssessed and killed. Witnessing Anniceris’s steady good humor, Posidonius 
could conceive the definite end of eliminating his particular distress through 
Anniceris’s philosophy. Eating, drinking and conversing with Anniceris for a 
day, Posidonius might think, “I want to enjoy this again tomorrow.” After a series 
of similar decisions, each taken with a view to particular pleasures or avoidances 
of pain, Posidonius might find his distress greatly lessened, his theoretical and 
practical command of Anniceris’s philosophy progressing, and his desire to 
return to Anniceris every day firmly entrenched. His general transformation of 
lifestyle and character would thus have occurred accidentally, as it were, through 
specific decisions.115
What comes across more than anything as centrally important for the purposes 
of an ethical imaginary or poesis of presentism in Lampe’s treatment of monochronality 
is not the philosophical viability of wedding presentism with the possibility of 
happiness achieved indirectly; rather, it is that, by focusing on the present and the 
indeterminacy of that present as pragma, we actually come to manage its plasticity and 
even perform its indeterminacy in favor of not only an egoist outcome but a potentially 
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intersubjective meliorism. By contrast identities and worlds that consolidate temporality 
and objectile consistencies erode otherwise contingent interconnections of pleasurable 
outcomes by insisting on a temporal  stability to things that requires an overemphasis on 
the social order’s ethical prioritization as seen with Kant. With something like pleasure, 
pragma and presentism these other projects will tend toward perforation and inherit a 
more loose connection with the future in ways that are productive. Of the multiple 
accounts handed down to us of Aristippus, there is a consistent emphasis on Aristippus’ 
adaptability and his ability to accommodate himself to the situation or pragma at hand. 
For Lampe, this achieves the other virtue of “sociability” for which Aristippus was 
known––his ability to find cheer amidst any sort of company.  116
This social cunning blends into temperance as Diogenes’ testimony proceeds, 
beginning with the statement that Aristippus “always dealt successfully with 
whatever happened.” The phrase “deal successfully” (eu diatithemenos) implies 
active manipulation of the situation. […] One reason Aristippus makes such good 
use of available opportunities, this passage hints, is because he knows that most 
situations offer some pleasures. This hint is corroborated by the very next clause, 
which says that Aristippus enjoys what is present and does not worry about 
what is absent.
Far from contradicting the emphasis Aristippus places on education and 
virtue, his effort to concentrate on the present thus presupposes and helps to 
justify it. It is only by understanding emotionally and intellectually what matters 
and knowing that one has the capacity to secure these goods that anyone can 
really focus on the present. That is why pseudo-Plutarch claims Aristippus 
learned this by studying Odysseus, who is not only renowned for courage and 
effectiveness in battle, but more particularly for his temperance and cunning. 
Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can 
be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.
Like their notional founder Aristippus, the later Cyrenaics are committed to a 
series of values beyond the experiences of pleasure and pain. … [T]hese values 
imply the Cyrenaics are interested in what sort of people they are and what sort 
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of lives they lead. To put it another way, these values show us how the Cyrenaics 
attempt to construct a way of life on the foundation of the goodness of pleasant 
experiences and badness of painful ones.117
It is now beginning to become clear how an interpersonal ethics of cosmopolitan 
import becomes accessible through a presentist temporality and loosely aggregated self 
whose interests in pleasure and pain are––because of the relative indeterminacy and 
multiple possibilities for these––a pragma that render the present in quite plastic and 
malleable terms. Yet these terms are not without ethical possibility except that they 
completely alter the scope of cosmopolitan practice and even undo what is otherwise 
conceived of as this kind of bifurcation of political space between the state and the 
public. To understand how Cyrenaic pursuits dramatically enact this, it helps to look at 
the dramatic and ironic undoing of conventional views of value as they are monetized 
and likewise conventional views of gender as they are characterized through sexual 
practice in Aristippus’s time.
If there is any other philosopher from the Socratic period who seems as bent as 
Diogenes the Cynic on ‘defaming the currency’, it is Aristippus. Yet Aristippus does this 
in a radically different way than the ascetic Diogenes. Central to the Cyrenaic ironic 
undoing of monetized value is their presentism. Aristippus was of course known for his 
extravagance; although it is not clear the degree to which these stories have been 
embellished. It appears that however, exaggerated they may have been, central to these 
tales of extravagance is a dramatic and philosophical critique of value that is very 
different––and arguably more productive––than that of Cynic asceticism. That 
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divergence from asceticism as it also maintains the possibility for unsettling the 
monetizing norms of value that seemingly dictate how asceticism is configured and limit 
the Cynic in many ways appears to necessitate philosophy as both dialogic and dramatic 
enactments. For example, there is the story told by Diogenes Laertius of Aristippus 
being criticized by another philosopher when he is seen carrying rich foods with him. 
The following exchange ensues. 
“Would not you have bought this if you could have got it for three obols?” 
The answer being in the affirmative, “Very well, then,” said Aristippus, “I am no 
longer a lover of pleasure, it is you who are a lover of money.”118
And in a similar fashion:
Polyxenes the sophist once paid him a visit and, after having seen ladies 
present and expensive entertainment, reproached him with it later. After an 
interval Aristippus asked him, “Can you join us today?” On the other accepting 
the invitation, Aristippus inquired, “Why, then, did you find fault? For you 
appear to blame the cost and not the entertainment.”119
And:
When his servant was carrying money and found the load too heavy––the 
story is told by Bion in his Lectures––Aristippus cried, “Pour away the greater 
part, and carry no more than you can manage.”120
In all of these anecdotes, presentism becomes a lens that undoes the monetization 
of value. Hegesias will likewise emphasize that the rich are no more content than the 
poor, and this is not a novel theme. However, what is interesting is that the present and 
its indeterminacy with regard to future pleasure means that money can not be an 
objective in and of itself, nor linear continuity with the present provisional order as the 
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sole imaginal possibility of collective morality’s futurity. Aristippus’s relationships with 
courtesans are also a common theme. They are treated in a similar fashion as his 
temporal lens undoes the possibility for any inhering stable expectations of obligation 
other than as may be cultivated pleasurably. His relationship with the famous courtesan 
Laïs finds him being interrogated about her relations with other men; to this he responds 
that he does not own her but that they both get pleasure from time to time from one 
another. This is an important implication of the philosophy of process that Tsouna, 
Zilioli and Lampe help us reconstruct; that the kinds of claims over things and people 
can no longer be viewed as settled or stable.
In turning the political, the central point of contestation between Aristippus and 
his Cynic contemporary Diogenes of Sinope can now be examined. This is the 
configuration of pleasure and ethics with regard to political power. There is an 
entertaining story from the Lives of the Eminent Philosophers that is picked up by Foucault, 
and this gets right at the heart of why, at least in the present contemplation of 
international ethics, it may be more ethically productive to think in terms of poesis as 
epidemics of the imaginary rather than pursuing a methodology of genealogy. One 
might perhaps say that this distinction yet carries a great deal of Foucaultian sympathies 
about the present’s contingency, but this departure from genealogy as such also finds its 
bearing in the genealogist's tendency to focus on an unsubstantiated quasi-linearity of 
ideational-discursive traceability which is arguably just as performative of the present 
“West” and of intractable imperial projection through history as it is divulging of the 
present’s contingent origin. In Government of Self and Others, Foucault relates the 
!85
following anecdote from Diogenes Laertius of the encounter between Cynic Diogenes 
and Plato.
One day, Plato would have seen Diogenes the Cynic washing his salad. Plato 
sees him washing his salad, and recalling that Dionysius had appealed to 
Diogenes and that Diogenes had rejected his appeal, he says to him: If you had 
been more polite to Dionysius you would not have to wash your salad. To which 
Dionysius replies: If you had acquired the habit of washing your salad “you 
would not have been the slave of Dionysius.” I think this anecdote from 
Diogenes Laertius is very important and very serious. It indicates the two poles 
in terms of which, and very quickly, from the fourth century, the problem of the 
meeting point between philosophical truth-telling and political practice found 
two points of insertion: the public arena or the Prince’s soul. And we will find 
these two polarities throughout the history of Western thought. Should 
philosophical discourse be the discourse addressed to the Prince’s soul in order 
to form it? Or should the true discourse of philosophy be delivered in the public 
arena as challenge, confrontation, derision, and criticism with regard to the 
Prince’s action and to political action?121
Almost this exact story occurs twice in the chapter on Aristippus from Lives of the 
Eminent Philosophers; however, there it is related that the encounter described above 
between Diogenes the Cynic does not include Plato, but rather Aristippus and later on 
Theodosius the Cyrenaic and Metroclus the Cynic.  What is more this anecdote 122
appears in the Cynic Epistles of the second century CE with regard to Diogenes and 
Aristippus, but never is it mentioned there with regard to Plato.  Lastly, in an 123
alternative anecdote that is quite similar, Diogenes scolds Aristippus for his being a slave 
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to Dionysius, but, unlike with Plato, Aristippus issues as a rebuttle from a lost play of 
Sophocles saying that ‘one who comes as a free man is no slave’.  124
In the Cyrenaic version, the tale goes as follows. Diogenes initiates the 
conversation by calling out to Aristippus while washing vegetables that if Aristippus has 
made vegetables his diet, he would not have frequented the court of a tyrant. To this 
Aristippus replies that if Diogenes had frequented the court of a tyrant, he would not be 
washing vegetables. It is of course possible that Plato had a similar conversation with 
Diogenes, perhaps everyone did. But the anecdote seems to have been taken up as a 
central theme in the inter-relations between Cynic and Cyrenaic thought since it appears 
in so many instances. That the Cynic Epistles of 200 CE relate the same Cynic-Cyrenaic 
disagreement suggests that at least from the standpoint of Cynic memory into 200 CE, 
the more philosophically relevant opponent on this question of lifestyle/accommodation 
of tyranny were the Cyrenaics, for there is no record of the Plato anecdote there. 
Foucault may not be wrong per se to focus on the Plato story, but if this ethically charged 
story is, from the Cynic perspective, more a Cyrenaic-Cynic question, and not so much 
about a Prince’s soul that neither of these groups cared about, then that changes things a 
little bit. Foucault is writing about the polarity of spaces of critique, but he is writing the 
Greeks retrospectively as torn necessarily between the alternative figures of Plato and 
the Cynic. But Foucault’s imaginary requires that the Cyrenaics not be their for such a 
polarity to issue from this encounter, or rather that the Cyrenaics never be a part of this 
story. This is because the Cyrenaics undo the polarity of those alternative spaces in the 
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same way that they destabilized value and gender relations––by dialogic affairs that 
enact pleasure’s presence, whether for the Prince or for the common student, through 
indeterminate presentist dramatics. 
What I suggest here is that it is much more fruitful to think of philosophy’s 
critical engagement with princely power in terms of the Cyrenaic-Cynic alternatives as it 
is repeatedly told of those two groups. Not only is there more historical evidence; it is 
also a more productive debate. It is not an interesting anecdote when Plato approaches 
Diogenes, given Diogenes’s radical anti-institutional behavior and antics in the agora. It 
merely comes off as a childish provocation by Plato. For Foucault, the Plato story leaves 
us with an intransigent polarity of political space, but not really in the form that 
Foucault understands it. This is not really Foucault’s hegemonic West. Plato and 
Diogenes are just two pompous philosophers among many. The Prince’s soul is not a big 
deal for most philosophers in Athens because most people in Athens are not Platonists; 
so the dyad actually falls apart when presented as spatial polarity of critique. In the 
context of the agora that Plato and Diogenes inhabited, as populated by figures like 
Aristippus, the Skeptics and the Sophists etc.., Foucault’s West is not present. It is 
unimaginable that Plato has anything to prove by telling Diogenes that he could have 
lived otherwise. Of course Diogenes could have lived otherwise, and any lesson that 
Diogenes could be said to offer Plato in the way of a rebuke makes no difference to Plato. 
It is only useful as an anecdote that admits the impossibility of resolution between two 
statically opposed poles, not that of the Prince’s soul and of the public square but just of 
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Plato and Diogenes. That was the nature of philosophy as the public drama of critique in 
the agora; it was more about the personalities.
But the Cyrenaics actually pose a challenge to Cynic thought and apparently 
Cynic memory as the Cynic Epistles attests. For the Cynic feels that Diogenes has met 
the Cyrenaics on their own ground; for if pleasure is so indeterminate, then you 
Aristippus could have yet lived pleasurably on vegetables and not had to endure the 
reputation of one who panders to tyrants. But of course the Cyrenaics feel they have the 
upper hand because there is no ground for judging which is better; they merely appear 
as alternative courses taken by each in the reflective moment of this encounter that 
presents their alterity. The focus here is not on the bifurcation of spaces for critique 
between the court/Prince’s soul and the agora/public space; it is on the question of the 
philosopher’s own self-possession with regard to money and employment. Diogenes 
and the Cynics view diet and ascetic habits as all important in maintaining an 
unbeholdenness to social institutions and thereby consolidating autonomy and self-
possession. There are many places that the Cynic does not frequent, not just the Prince’s 
court. But as Aristippus famously said when inquired about his going to Dionysius’s 
disreputable court in what could have been viewed as a disavowal of Socrates’s 
teachings, “When I needed wisdom, I went to Socrates; and now that I need money I 
come to [Dionysius].”  125
The bifurcation of public and courtly spaces tends to unravel when Aristippus is 
thrown in the mix because Cyrenaic and Cynic philosophy was never about critiquing 
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power but rather opinion as such and this for the purpose of cultivating a sense of self-
possession. The pursuit was not critique but pedagogy and epistemology for their own 
sake. Aristippus’s philosophy could never entertain a moral alterity to this question of 
two spaces that Foucault poses because different seasons call for different things––
sometimes one wants wisdom at other times one wants money. This agora of the 
Cyrenaics was never a single agora but always tied to other agoras and cities through 
the ambulant personas. Aristippus did not make for Athens because it was the center of 
Greek life. He went to the Olympiad where he heard about Socrates and then went to 
see Socrates. For him, there was nothing significant about Athens or about the 
philosophical milieu of Athens after Socrates that is why he left. This complex social 
space may have been lost to the Mediterranean of post-imperial antiquity at least in the 
manner that Aristippus inhabited it. Pedagogy was dramatic and public and 
indeterminate. Cyrenaic philosophy’s unsettling of rigid spatial and temporal social 
framing might arguably be thought of in this way: Cyrenaics––and other philosophers 
like them––tended to carry the agora with them because the agora was many places. 
And so every place they went was likewise inflected with an agora-like aura through 
them. Their status as teachers of wisdom and of their public persona as a dramatic one 
meant that every space they moved into saw something of the indeterminacy of a public 
dialogue and the question of wisdom posed of that space, and this with multiple 
possibilities for and in proximity to the coursing of the city’s life. Enjoy what you can get 
away with saying where and when you can. The real question of importance to the 
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Cyrenaic and Cynic debate regards money and the philosopher’s ownership of self. This 
brings up serious questions for academics today that we cannot get into. 
Black Athena or Creole Cyrenaica
Being rooted in a place is a different kind of experience from have and cultivating a 
‘sense of place.’ A truly rooted community may have shrines and monuments, but it is 
unlikely to have museums and societies for the preservation of the past. The effort to evoke 
a sense of place and of the past is often deliberate and conscious. To the extent that the 
effort is conscious it is the mind at work, and the mind––if allowed its imperial sway––
will annul the past by making it all present knowledge. 
–– Yi-Fu Tuan 126
Revisiting Aristippus and the Cyrenaics allows us to return to the space of 
Mediterranean agora and its poesis. Rather than revisiting Greek philosophy for a set of 
doctrines and insisting that our account acknowledge their traceability and alteration 
into Roman and Christian life, we contemplate the alternative spatial renderings of 
philosophical bodies. While the Epicurean, Stoic, Aristotelian and Platonic movements 
are consolidated in different schools under Roman rule in the Mediterranean, the 
consolidation of the Cynic tradition has likewise been tied to a kind of monastic 
tradition of asceticism and critical renunciation of society. All of this falls in line with 
what the genealogists of the early Christian period tell us. But what interests us here is 
the undoing of the space of the agora. As mentioned in the previous interlude, the 
political project for Plotinus is imagined in terms of a city of philosophers within the 
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Roman empire. Similarly with the Epicureans, Peripatetics and Stoics, the space of 
pedagogy within the Roman empire becomes an institutional space of adherents and a 
consolidation of particular schools where, as in the case of Epicurus already mentioned, 
it becomes possible not to engage in dialogic inquiry and dramatic contestation but 
rather to engender a more insulated contemplation and written elaboration of those 
doctrines particular to given schools. This outline does not intend to overstate the 
limitations that this trend imposed on debate and the poetic transference of ideas as the 
Mediterranean was imperialized in ways that it never had been. The important point, 
however, is that the agora space no longer appears as it was in Cyrenaic philosophical 
life, and perhaps this had something to do with the efficacy with which pagan shrines 
were destroyed and religious persecutions emerged as a normative social feature of the 
late empire. The Cyrenaic philosophical view is not a view that is inaccessible culturally 
or linguistically for us. But spatially with regards to pedagogy alone perhaps. Therefore, 
it might be worthwhile to explore Cyrenaica and the agoras of the North African 
Mediterranean as spaces where such a philosophy has, in the spatial imaginaries of the 
past, taken on a kind of epidemic force, one that morphed into a pedagogy that 
espoused drama and joy amidst political indeterminacy and never without making itself 
public.
In Martin Bernal’s Black Athena he shows the multiple ethnic and continental 
origins of Greek society by showing how Romantic scholarship of the 19th century 
constructed the Europeanness of the Greeks retrospectively.  His first volume shows 127
 Martin Bernal (1987) Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. Vol. I The Fabrication of 127
Ancient Greece 1785-1985. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
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how Romantic scholarship constructs this Europeanness as if deaf to a myriad of signs 
across Greek life that point to its multiple cultural origins. He published two more 
volumes which laid out the archeological and linguistic evidence for the multiple origins 
of Greek language and material life.128
While I agree with Robbie Shilliam that it is important “to build your own cross-
cultural relationalities that are not illuminated by the all-blinding foil of the Greeks”;  a 129
kind of presentism on my own part views the Cyrenaics––in light of Bernal’s evidence 
on the creolity of the Greeks themselves––in the space of the agoras of those centuries 
and sees something that speaks a language of an indeterminate self and a pliable 
relationality in the world that does away with the imperative of peace as cast in terms of 
“cross-cultural” in favor of an admission of a loosely aggregated creolity to life 
pedagogically pursued. Therefore, this chapter has perhaps more to say of the space of 
Cyrenaic creolity in articulating a philosophy bound up with its places of pedagogy as 
its practice has been very much overwritten by our imaginaries of the Greek polity and 
of its import for us.
In light of Bernal’s linguistic research and of the effort here to cast the social 
space of the agora in a slightly different light that Foucault’s juxtaposition of the agora 
with the court, Creole Cyrenaica appears as originary as any other Greek movement to 
 Martin Bernal (1991) Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. Vol. II: The Archeological and 128
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Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. Vol. III The Linguistic Evidence. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press. It is important to note of his critics that none have compiled anything close to the kind of 
extensive linguistic and archeological research to challenge his findings.
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the linguistic and material origination of the Greek vocabulary as such. Zilioli writes of 
the robustness of the Cyrenaics’s philosophical corpus and of its presence in 
Mediterranean life,
We are therefore far from the traditional picture of the Cyrenaics as a minor 
Socratic school with a restricted philosophical interest in ethics alone. In addition 
to hedonism, the Cyrenaics not only developed an original epistemology, but 
were also committed to indeterminacy in metaphysics and to behaviorism in the 
philosophy of language. This makes the Cyrenaic school a proper philosophical 
school, with a clear and sophisticated theoretical agenda. On the ground of this 
more positively oriented interpretation of the Cyrenaic school (and, by extension, 
of the other two Socratic schools of the Megarics and the Cynics about which 
there is still much to learn), Plato and Aristotle appear to have been not giants in 
a philosophical desert, but two great philosophers in good company. The Socratic 
schools were minor up to a certain point.130
Here, it is important to emphasize that the denotation of minor and major is itself 
even deceiving because it paints a retrospective. The Cynic Epistles co-opt Aristippus 
with as much import as their cooptation of Plato. Furthermore, the configuration of 
minor as opposed to major implies a kind of rendering of an entirety for the space of 
ancient philosophy whereby such determinations are made. However, if we cast aside 
the need for singular determinations about relative influence being as these come to be 
over-determined by the spatial and temporal parameters of our own regard; it is clear 
that we may find many Cyrenaic sensibilities in places we would not otherwise expect. 
Likewise, we may look more closely at spaces where the historical record suggests 
unqualifiably the majorness of Cyrenaic thought. And this would thereby allow us to 
speculate as to how such spaces as allow for epidemic enactments of Cyrenaic poetics to 
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hold imaginal traction far beyond their containment and minimalization in other 
contexts.
One of the important reasons to refuse the determination of minor and major has 
a lot to do with what we mean by influence as opposed to relevance. And here relevance 
should be broadly understood not as some kind of social, philosophical or political 
relevance but rather experiential. For, on the one hand, it is possible to pose 
transcendental questions of the discursive type that Kant engages in with the concepts of 
freedom and right but rather from a Cyrenaic interest on the ethicality of avoiding pain 
and suffering. Why is it that the vocabulary commonly deployed for speaking about 
political and social life often deploys the vocabulary of epidemiology and health? One of 
our sources tells that the conversion of Dionysus of Heraclea left the Stoics and joined 
the Cyrenaics because of a physical illness. Lampe describes the conversion of Dionysus 
“The Turncoat” as follows:
As a Stoic, Dionysius knew a battery of arguments demonstrating that pain 
and suffering were indifferent. His acute illness should not therefore have 
affected his judgment of his own well-being. But at the level Lucian describes as 
his “bodily philosophizing,” he was profoundly certain that his situation was 
very unsatisfying indeed. Thus he decided that there was an irreconcilable 
conflict between his doctrines and the intuitions those doctrines were supposed 
to clarify and organize.131
Likewise, the practice today of rich countries poaching healthcare workers from 
poorer countries and the overtness whereby wealthy countries with tightly controlled 
immigration respond to refugee crises in other countries by first allowing doctors and 
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nurses refugee status suggests that the cosmopolitan question of hospitality itself is shot 
through by physical desires for healing. Therefore, the decision to focus on the Cyrenaics 
in this chapter is important to outline. On the one hand, Tsouna identifies in Cyrenaic 
epistemology proximity to modern philosophical skepticisms  from Descartes on but 
with important qualifications. 
From a systemic point of view, the Cyrenaic doctrine introduced a form of 
subjectivism which in some ways appears to pre-announce the subjectivism of 
Descartes, as endorsed by Malebranche and Hume and developed by Kant. […] 
In contrast to the moderns, the Cyrenaics assumed that empirical objects exist 
and that they act upon us in various ways. Nevertheless, their skepticism, more 
than any other epistemological position in antiquity, resembles what modern 
philosophy calls skepticism about the external world.  132
The premise, therefore, is that by honing in on those philosophical currents of the 
pre-imperial Mediterranean which most resemble the dominant philosophers of today’s 
academic-poetic edifice, we might highlight the notable ways in which contemporary 
political-philosophical poetics rhetorically insist on a certain spatial and temporal 
imaginary whose orientation is assured less by their epistemology and more by their 
poetic reliance on a state of nature aesthetic, on the one hand, or philosophy as political 
critique, on the other, for their conceptions about political possibility.
Secondly, Cyrenaic cosmopolitanism, as described above in its temporality of 
presentism and in its attentiveness to pleasure’s indeterminacy and possibility, provides 
a productive space for undoing the poetics current and categories which appear more 
than any disciplinary apparatus to govern the terms of what philosophical positions are 
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of political import for thinking the problem of international space and coexistence other 
than through the spatial parameters commonly deployed. This second point, with its 
emphasis on presentism which is at the heart of Cyrenaic ethics and its corollary “loose” 
self, as Zilioli describes it, can thereby become grounds for populating our political 
discussions with a multi-lingual poetics and allowing to pass across the frontiers of 
academic disciplines those voices who might otherwise be condemned to historical 
interest without political import. The importance of Cyrenaic presentism and the 
cosmopolitanism of Aristippian poesis will come out in the final chapter dedicated to the 
exploration of the theory of international peace and diplomacy articulated by one of 
Kant’s 18th century contemporaries who lived in Timbuktu and who at the same time of 
increased global interconnection was positing a theory wholly different from Kant’s and 
yet arguable more productive for thinking about the cosmopolitan problematic. 
In order to really grapple with this last point, it is important to better situate 
Cyrenaica historically and to explain the reference to creolity in the title of this essay. 
Rather than imagining creolity as hybridity between two distinct cultures whose contact 
engenders intermingling and transference of linguistic and symbolic elements; creolity 
might best be understood in terms of what Glissant has described as ‘vertiginous 
variences’.  Bernal shows that Greek language and material culture were––like all 133
languages as Glissant reminds us––the products of multiple origins, yet those origins 
were not being catalogued in museums as such. To posit Cyrenaic creolity, therefore, is 
not necessarily to situate Cyrenaica or Cyrenaic thought on the liminal periphery 
 Edouard Glissant (2010) Poetics of Relation. trans. Betsy Wing. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 133
107.
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between the properly Greek world and the African hinterland. Rather, it situates 
Cyrenaica as a site that is traversed by broad-ranging poetic and symbolic currents 
whose spatial overlappings and origins are so extensive that rendering them identifiably 
Greek vis-à-vis non-Greek is revealed as being more reiterative of a particular sensibility 
for a pan-Hellenism as articulated in Herodotus’s pursuit for Hellenic solidarity among 
Peleponesian Greeks and Ionian Greeks for the purpose of summoning the former’s 
interest in rolling back Persian influence in Ionia. Our own interest in delineating ethnic 
difference distracts us from the creolity of Greek life on the one hand––as Greeks 
themselves evidently lived in recognition of many shared elements of religious life with 
Egpytians and the like; and, on the other hand, speculate about what the multilinguality 
of North Africa meant for the Greek philosophers like Aristippus who affiliated wisdom 
with the cosmopolitan practice of finding enjoyment amidst any company and assured 
us that the wise are defined by their ability to live unchanged even when all political 
laws are withdrawn. The important point is that creolity posits itself as a resilient 
alternative to the aesthetics of a state of nature as they are tirelessly invoked by modern 
theorists in justifying the need for the provisional order’s maintenance/expansion, and 
likewise to the critical theorists who feel their works as directed really never arrive at 
their proper place of inhabitation––torn between the souls of princes and an abstract 
public.
Within the Cyrenaic movement, there were many alternative courses that could 
not be covered here, but to give a sense we should conclude with Hegesias. He focused 
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more on suffering in something of a Buddhist turn in the Cyrenaic movement. Diogenes 
Laertius gives us the following description of his school.
They denied the possibility of happiness, for the body is infected with much 
suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body and is a prey to 
disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows that 
happiness cannot be realized. Moreover, life and death are each desirable in turn. 
[…] They affirm that allowance should be made for errors, for no man errs 
voluntarily, but under constraint of some suffering; that we should not hate men, 
but rather teach among them (metadidaxein).134
There was a recent archeological discovery of a Socratic dialogue from Ptolomaic 
Egypt written on a papyrus and wrapped around a mummy. Lampe and Spinelli  135
agree that, although we can never be certain, the most likely author of this dialogue is 
Hegesias, or one of his disciples. Hegesias was active in North Africa at the time, and the 
philosophical teachings that the text engenders match the teachings of Hegesias from 
other sources to a degree that is true of no other philosophical school, excepting perhaps 
the Epicurians, but they did not have a tradition of writing Socratic dialogues.  Here 136
Socrates wrapped around this Ptolomaic mummy, Socrates offers his reason for not 
putting up a legal defense in his trial and the questioner responds as follows.
To you and me, Socrates, and to anyone who thinks that pleasure is the best 
end of life, and distress the worst, you would appear to have defended yourself 
well in all these matters, because you offered no defense regarding the death 
penalty. Other people, who posit that the fine and the fine life are the best end, 




and that the shameful and the shameful life are the worst, won’t want to agree 




Sophocles and the Syntax of the Loosely Aggregated Self
Felix Budelmann writes of Sophoclean language and of the unexpected turns of 
the dramatist’s sentences; he describes the dramatist’s sentences “go out of their way to 
make sure that spectators understand them and, at the same time, suggest that there is 
still more to be understood.”  They accomplish this through enacting expectations that 138
are then presented with an unexpected turn.  This feature of Sophoclean language 139
negotiates something about language that can be problematic as it relates to philosophy 
and the pathae––a risk about language and the world which Budelmann describes as 
follows:
The risk of sentences that point at themselves is that they appear not to point 
at anything else. They are in danger of suggesting that there is nothing apart 
from the words of the sentence; that is why their rhetoric is often called empty. 
Sophocles’ sentences, whose beginnings so often give wrong clues about their 
continuation, make it easy to believe that they react to something in the 
world...By not pointing at themselves to the degree that Gorgias’ sentences do, 
they may seem to point at something that there is beyond their words.”140
Their poetics enact this through sentences that are unpredictable yet often lucid; 
“they are unpredicatable and therefore often appear to reflect the equally unpredictable 
world beyond them.”  These linguistic turns, in Budelmann’s analysis, show 141
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Sophoclean poetics to perform the felt presence of “something that there is beyond 
words” and this is likewise intermixed with presences off-stage and otherwise 
inaccessible currents of emotion within characters themselves as pathaec aspects of a self 
which fails to conform with Gorgias’s manner of speaking and with the linearity and 
explicit referentiality of Gorgias’s thought. The affair––pragma––of language and 
characters on the stage––as spectacle––tends, through Sophoclean syntax with its 
fragmented interlacing of imageries and unpredictable turns, to enact involvement by 
spectators by building expectations amidst supple unexpected turns.  The language 142
thereby conjures a world into the lives of the characters’ voices and into the scene as 
visited by and imbricated in the indeterminacy of that present world. These openings for 
pathaec involvement result, for Budelmann, in the possibility of communal experience 
through the shared conjunction of multiple presences––on and off stage as well as within 
and outside of language––drawn together in shared spectacles of unpredicatable 
interconnection and turns. Spectators who share the emotive flux that the twists and 
turns of Sophoclean language produce may not share it in the same way and yet they 
share it, sparking at times an imprecise but felt need for collective action.  143
The ‘theres’ outside the self-referentiality of language, of the characters, and of 
their appearances on the visible stage are the stuff of a Sophoclean syntactical 
production. These ‘theres’ are not a world or cosmos but a scene as indeterminate 
pragma, wherein the acute presence of those elements of ‘there’ and of their 
 ibid. Budelmann uses involvement as a central feature of his analysis142
 ibid. 194 Spectator ‘involvement’ is the word Budelmann focuses on, and also see the chapter, “The 143
chorus: Shared survival” (ibid. 195-272) on the chorus’s role in rendering the form of this collective action in 
terms of the demos though still somewhat imprecisely defined in this regard.
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unpredictable influence on the current of events as shared spectacle––through the supple 
linguistic turns––cast these enacting elements of ‘there’ as interconnected loosely, and as 
presently loose connection with future outcomes. This is important in the context of this 
book as it puts in relief the singularity of the Plotinian ‘there’ of the singular cosmic 
eternal Being. Recall from the first interlude, Plotinus’s language of eternal intelligible 
being; the ‘here’ and the ‘there’ juxtaposition is Plotinus’s signature formula repeated 
consistently. These were Plotinus’s routine spatial referents in his juxtaposition of that 
eternally proximous presence of Being emanating in the world with the chronological 
time of the self’s fragmented impressions of that formal world. 
Recall from the first interlude that Plotinus’s and Porphyry’s lives in philosophy 
were also visited by depression. This possibility of depression was easily curable in both 
cases, but it came in the way of a need to move, a tendency toward a peregrination that 
philosophy could not remedy as static contemplation and Plotinian visualization. 
Plotinus came to Ammonius after leaving those teachers in Alexandria whose teaching 
precipitated a depression. When he left Ammonius, it was to go visit with the 
philosophers of Persia and India. About the details of this we know very little. But when 
Porphyry suffered his suicidal depression, Plotinus  sends him away to travel––to 
peregrinate––perhaps to find some beauty that was not the pure beauty of the ‘there’ of 
pure Being, but rather of a more concrete chronological ‘out there’. This ‘there’ of the 
eternal intelligible realm in Plotinus––as presented in the second interlude of this book, 
which was emanating in the plenorum of the cosmos and elementally agglomerated 
with the chronological psyche, appears to not have always been close enough. Something 
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like a movement––a movement to a more realizable ‘out there’; or perhaps even a ‘not 
here’ is what Porphyry needed. This appears to have been the non-philosophical 
antidote for this almost suicidal depression––a depression that Plotinus diagnosed well 
writ on Porphyry’s body without the young scholar ever making mention of it. 
When we read in Felix Budelmann of how Sophoclean sentences––perhaps more 
effectively than Plotinus’s ‘visualization exercises’ ––manage to manifest a ‘there’ that 144
is both a beyond the spectacle of the stage and a beyond the language of origination; this 
is an important philosophical opening for considering the poetic. The poetic may 
likewise be understood, in this interlude on Sophocles, as akin to the translation from 
the previous chapter on the Cyrenaic phrase––‘tae poaetika taes haedonaes’ translated as 
‘the enacting elements of pleasure’, or ‘the poetics of pleasure’ which, indeterminate as 
they were, the Cyrenaics refused to categorize. Poetics here means ‘the enacting 
elements’ in the Sophoclean drama’s infusion of pathaec flux across spectators in the 
language of a singular scene to which they are all connected. The enacting elements of 
Sophoclean language bring something more than the static image that the Plotinian 
visual imagery of an illuminated cosmos conjured for his pupils in a quest to present a 
‘there’ of the cosmic order connecting the thread of psyche to an entirety of all present 
beauty. Sophoclean language enacts something that the Cyrenaics would have 
recognized as a pathae––an internal movement and not an image as with Plotinus. 
Sophoclean language, in this regard, may have more capacity for healing––political, 
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spiritual, physical etc..––than Plotinian poesis. Sophocles’s ‘there’ was more inflected in 
the ‘here’ as pathaec currents of imaginal reverie.
Through Felix Budelmann’s insights into Sophoclean language, this essay looks 
at a few sentences which Budelmann does not explore, sentences here that present the 
dramatic self in Sophoclean tragedy as akin to the Cyrenaic ‘loose self’ of Zilioli as 
presented in the previous chapter.  Recall from the previous chapter that Cyrenaic 145
hedonist ethics developed a temporal disposition of ‘monochronality’––or a life that 
pursues the present temporal moment and its potential for pleasurable experience or 
possibility for suffering. This was favored over the abstract wholeness of a eudaimonist 
“good life” which, for the Cyrenaics, tends to border on a quasi-meaningless 
aggregation. A good life for them must mean pleasures––plural––as experienced in a 
present which is always singular as experience yet dialogic and multiply participatory. 
Beyond whatever similarity the Sophoclean self shares with the Cyrenaic ‘loose self’, 
Sophocles poeticizes selves of multiple temporalities through his dramatic poetics, and 
this in ways that require attending to. The dramatic and divine of Sophocles’s characters 
are inflected in the singular movement of the scene by multiple temporal and strewn 
affective elements that seem to loosely connects these in what we might call an 
attentiveness linguistically to the perforations of loosely aggregated selves––perforations 
that are often the locus were action morphs into the world. How then is the 
multitemporality of the Sophoclean loose self posed in a singular scene that tends 
toward monochronal experience for its audience? To examine this, a few examples of 
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Sophoclean language are treated here with attentiveness to Budelmann’s insight into 
syntax and the audience’s involvement. But here Sophoclean syntax is treated with an 
emphasis on temporality and the consequences of the scene's multiple temporalities as 
they are interwoven in the monochronality of the scene with its indeterminate 
connections to future outcomes.
The first sentence is from Antigone. It is from the scene where Antigone is 
contemplating her course of action. She is mourning her fallen brother Polynices and 
going back and forth with Ismene, her sister, about what she will do. Specifically, she is 
contemplating carrying out the illegal burial and funerary rights of her brother, and this 
would be in defiance of Creon and is punishable by death. To Ismene:
ἀλλ᾽ ἲσθ᾽ ὁποία σοι δοκεῖ, κεῖνον δ᾽ ἐγὼ
Then be as you must, and in that case I
θάψω. καλόν μοι τοῦτο ποιοῦσῃ θανεῖν
shall bury him. It would be beautiful for me to die in such an act
φίλη μετ᾽ ἀυτοῦ κείσομαι, φίλου μέτα,
I, beloved, beside him, shall lay in rest, he, beloved, beside ...
ὃσια πανουργήσασ᾽. ἐπεὶ πλείων χρόνος
A holy enactment. Since I will spend more time
ὃν δεῖ μ᾽ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω τῶν ἐνθάδε.146
below, I’ll have more time to win favor down there than here.
So in these four lines, Antigone inserts two odd words at a critical moment when 
her sentence fails to complete itself in the words expected. She moves through her 
featured argument from the decision to bury her brother, then to contemplation of the 
 All Greek citations of Sophocles are from the two volume corpus of Sophocles issued by the Leob 146
Classical Library series and all translations are mine; Sophocles (1994) Antigone. in Sophocles Vol. I-II. trans. 
Hugh Lloyd-Jones. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 71-75. Hereafter cited Sophocles, volume 
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beauty of such a pious act and death, then to her love for her brother, and then to the 
afterlife being longer than this one in its continuation as juridical and moral affair. She 
does not imply that the gods will necessarily be happy for her act; just that she will have 
more time to make her case and win their favor in Hades than she will with the people 
of Thebes. However, the interesting moment in these lines comes at the end of the 
second line and the beginning of the third. Antigone ends the second line above with a 
preposition, meta, that has no object, and interjects a very odd phrase in the beginning of 
the next line as its object. Hosia panourgaesasa is translated here as ‘a holy enactment’ or 
literally ‘a holy all-doing’. This is divine temporality inflected into the character and into 
the current of her sentence and of the scene in an unexpected syntactical turn.
The second line calls Antigone ‘philae' and her brother ‘philos' establishing a kind 
of mutual symmetry; she claims that they are destined to lie side by side in mutual 
love––both symmetrically dead in a mirroring of their symmetrical affection. The 
repetition of the preposition meta would likewise repeat that symmetry except it goes 
unfulfilled. The line and the thought end asymmetrically and unexpectedly. She ‘philae’ 
rests with him ‘autou’, but he ‘philou’ “is with ...” The line is finished, but the sentence is 
not. It leaves you hanging. You insert automatically Antigone as the object of the 
preposition, ‘meta’. The line is not ambiguous, but it takes an unexpected turn. Nor is 
there is any double meaning. Rather, the symmetry of the thought of her lying dead in 
mutual affection with Polynices is broken by the image of this divine action that renders 
their position––hers and Polynices––asymmetrical in the way of a present amorphous 
entanglement. She is alive, and so this entanglement is hers and not Polynices’s but is 
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also Ismene’s, Creon’s, the chorus’s and the gods’. At the very moment when the 
sentence leads the audience to expect a word that refers to herself as the object of 
meta––‘a holy all-doing’ is what they hear instead as Anitgone’s eyes light up. No one in 
the Athenian audience would have missed this as a moment of divine interjection into 
the course of the affair. 
Right at this strange unpredictable perforated moment, these words revisit the 
inadequacy of a judgment’s accounting for everything that is going into this decision. 
Even in Hades the case appears open, so the temporality of Antigone’s own eternity and 
of her accounting for this action is, then, compared to the civil judgment here, but these 
are imbricated since whatever the course of judgment ‘there’ will likewise come back 
‘here’. This broken-off statement that morphs into something else, something divine, in 
the next line transforms this character for an instant into the mouthpiece for the ethical 
imaginary inflected with the indeterminacy but acute presence of divine judgment’s 
relevance for the ‘here’. Every Athenian would have known that these words were the 
whisperings into Antigone’s mind of a divine deed that she is to carry out. It would be at 
this precise and unexpected turn in the scene and in this sentence when the audience 
would hear themselves saying ‘get ready we are in for it!’ The debate in Antigone’s mind 
is over; the gods are now driving this. Juxtapositions fail to account for the multiple 
entanglements of the affairs of kinship, divine endeavor, political rivalry and purpose; 
therefore rather than painting this asymmetry as a broad juxtaposition between laws of 
kinship, piety and state, the questions of sisterhood and of Polynices’s political life 
continued by divine means are given over to an indeterminacy felt in the present 
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unfolding and inflected by multiple termporalities of imaginal and poetic force behind 
the act determined to happen. What survives, however, is ethically indeterminate and, in 
this action contemplated, inhumanly so. Antigone’s excitement at the idea of 
transgression––a panourgaesasa, an ‘all-doing’, as opposed to a parrhaessia, an ‘all-telling’. 
An all-telling is a feature of the human perhaps, but an all-doing is unmistakably unique 
to the gods. This contemplation/image-act/discussion is an affair of the self and its 
image of singularity of present action as entanglement made with regard to Ismene also 
Creon also Aïdos also Polynices also Thebes but ultimately here transformed into as 
many currents from ‘there’. Singular judgment is deferred in the way of an alternative 
temporal duration for her making her case of what moved her to this hosia panourgaesasa. 
And we will hear her later in the play beginning to make her case before the gods as she 
is bound and marched to her death. The presence and yet alterity of what eternity’s 
judgment may favor over the judgment of the ‘here’ comes to be felt as juxtaposed but 
also imbricated and indeterminate in its ethicality and consequences. Yet all of these 
loose ends are spanned by a single scene and moment as interconnection of this 
deliberated ‘holy deed’ and drawn forward with the anticipation of Antigone winning 
her case in Aïdos in which case –– watch out Thebes. The play unfolds to produce the 
entanglement of both the ‘here’ and ‘there’ of judgment’s inadequacy and likewise of 
political rule in the form of law. Shortly, Creon makes his arrogant claim that a people 
only come to see the wisdom of their ruler when that ruler makes his wisdom manifest 
in his law. Sophocles’s poetics break the linearity of the syntactical progression and 
perforate the scene with alternative temporal and trans-spatial aspects that distribute 
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judgment in ways that dramatize the irreconcilability of law’s form as edict with the 
singularity of the act and the possibility of judging it’s repercussions.
Later in the play after Antigone has committed this holy transgression of burying 
her brother and been condemned, we find Antigone beginning to make her case before 
the gods. The affective language is nothing short of thrilling for the audience, and 
likewise the turn in a particular sentence would have had that audience covered in 
goose bumps as their imaginations of what would unfold from the gods who assuredly 
watched alongside them and assuredly were being riled into a fury. This audience 
would have felt Antigone’s words and known without a doubt that the gods will not be 
unmoved by this.
ὧν λοισθία ᾽γὼ καὶ κάκιστα δὴ μακρῷ
As last, I am likewise most wretched by far
κάτειμι, πρίν μοι μοῖραν ἐξήκειν βίου.
descending thus before the final end of life for me.
ἐλθουσα μέντοι κάρτ᾽ ἐν ἐλπίσιν τρέφω
But on returning there, I grow resilient with courage in hopes
φίλη μὲν ἥξειν πατρί, προσφιλὴς δὲ σοί,
of endearment to my father and of dearness to you,
μῆτερ, φίλη δὲ σοί, κασίγνητον κάρα.
mother, and to be dear to you, brother above all.
ἐπεὶ θανόντας αὐτόχειρ ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ
Upon your deaths, my very hands both washed
ἔλουσα κἀκόσμησα κἀπιτυμβίους
the filth from each of you and upon your graves
χοὰς ἔδωκα. νῦν δέ, Πολύνεικες, τὸ σὸν
offered libations. And now, Polynices, for the
δέμας περιστέλλουσα, τοιάδ´ ἄρνυμαι.
shrouding of your body, this is my reward.
καίτοι σ᾽ ἐγὼ ᾽τίμησα τοῖς φρονοῦσιν εὗ.
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And yet I honored you by those of sound judgment.
ὀυ γάρ ποτ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἄν εἰ τέκν᾽ ὧν μήτηρ ἔφυν
Such would not have happened were it my own child;
οὔτ᾽ εἰ πόσις μοι κατθανὼν ἐτήκετο,
nor, were my husband struck down and wasting away,
βίᾳ πολιτῶν τόνδ᾽ ἄν ᾐρόμην πόνον.
would, in the life of the citizens, this work have been sown.
τίνος νόμου δὴ ταῦτα πρὸς χάριν λέγω;
For the sake of what law indeed do I declare these things?
πόσις μὲν ἄν μοι κατθανόντος ἄλλος ἦν,
For were mine husband struck down so yet take another,
καὶ παῖς ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου φωτός, εἰ τοῦδ᾽ ἤμπλακον,
and likewise bear child with another, if this one were stricken;
μητρὸς δ᾽ ἐν Ἇιδου καὶ πατρὸσ κεκευθότοιν
but with my mother and father hidden away in Hades
οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἀδελφος ὅστις ἄνβλαστοι ποτέ.
there is no brother who ever could be born.
τοιῷδε μέντοι σ᾽ ἐκπροτιμήσασ᾽ ἐγὼ
Having honored you above all by this steadfast
νόμῳ, Κρέοντι ταῦτ᾽ ἔδοξ᾽ ἁμαρτάνειν
law, to Creon these things appear as transgressions
καὶ δεινὰ τολμᾶν, ὦ κασίγνητον κάρα.147
and as horrors enduring - oh brother above all.
Sophoclean characters, as loosely aggregated subjects, inhabit thick time of 
quickening divine and human currents, and this in language and through the singular 
spectacle of the scene. Treating Antigone in her elemental existence––in the poetics of the 
author and in the imaginaries of his audience in Athens––shows the interplay of 
temporal imaginaries and ethicality’s interwovenness by divine projection through the 
poetic spectacle of the unfolding affair, the pragma. Here Antigone’s lament to her 
 ibid. 895-915147
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brother in this passage deploys a curious phrase on two occassions––kasignaeton karâ––
meaning ‘brother above all’. But this is the exact same phrase from Oedipus Tyrannus 
where, in the opening of the play, Oedipus is addressed as ‘kratiston pâsin Oidipou karâ –– 
‘most powerful of all Oedipus above all’. This ominous phrase from the opening of that 
play would have been crystal clear in the memory of the audience in Athens. The 
repetition in this passage on two occasions of Antigone addressing her brother with this 
unique title, kapâ, would have conjured immediately the reference to the divine destiny 
of the great house of Cadmus. Every single Athenian, upon hearing this phrase now in 
Antigone, would instantly have recognized that Antigone is not just talking to her 
brother. She is conjuring the memory of the divine interest in the house of Cadmus. She 
does not even use the simple term for brother, adelphos, nor of kasis, but makes explicit 
reference to the lineage in calling him ‘kasignaeton’ –– literally ‘brother of the lineage’. 
Twice she repeats this like a refrain, and you can be sure that everyone in that audience 
knew that whatever she was saying ‘here’ on this stage was right at the center of the 
gods’ interests, deliberations and pathae. 
When readers today speculate about Antigone’s apparent filial piety as central to 
her ethics, and ask why she appears to disown kinship loyalty with regard to any 
replaceable member of her family, they miss the point. Antigone knows that this is not 
about her or her family. She is expressing reverence to the divine scheme that she 
endured with honor. If this was just about her, she would not put the citizenry through 
this affair that is about to unfold. When she says this, she is performing her humility in a 
speech that she knows the gods are listening to. She is telling them that I am not so bold 
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as to think that my life is above that of the city. I am respecting the law of honor and 
your divine interest in the fate of the line of Cadmus. This is about Thebes and Cadmus. 
She must make it explicitly clear to the gods: this is your affair. This is about the divine 
plan that she, Antigone, always accepted her role in and did so with reverence for the 
gods. She would have likely even had a dream where she was told that she must fulfill 
the funerary rites of the line of Oedipus by burying Polynices. The citizenry of Athens 
probably would have even assumed this dream had occurred. Of course, Antigone does 
not declare this on the stage publicly to anyone; you do not share your dreams 
haphazardly when gods come to you; especially not a dream like this lest someone tell 
one of the other gods what events are being planned. Here Antigone is conjuring the line 
of Cadmus and recounting, in this wretched state of her being bound and marched to 
death, each and every member of that line of karâ that she with her own hands ritually 
purified out of honor for the gods in their conducting of the fate of this great and tragic 
line. The irreplaceability of her brother is a reference to the political battle of the house of 
Cadmus which now has no one to replace it. She knows this spectacle will not leave the 
gods unmoved. Antigone is saying, ‘okay you guys, finish this.’
The ambiguity that punctuates this passage comes in the last line––‘Kreonti taut’ 
edoxa hamartanein kai deina tolman, ô kasignaeton kara’. It translates literally as follows: ‘For 
Creon these things, it appears, transgress and horrors (deina) endure. The beauty of the 
line is that the impersonal verb edoxa ‘it appears or seems that’ invites Creon’s 
invocation in the dative again after tolman––meaning in the second stanza, “it also 
appears for Creon that horrors endure or persist”. As Budelmann points out, the twists 
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and turns of these sentences generate expectation and then move in different directions 
without losing coherence but rather by pointing elsewhere––to the world and its 
almost/ already present becoming. Instead of saying, ‘Creon considers these things to 
transgress’; Antigone declares the following: ‘honoring you [Polynices] above all in this 
steadfast law, for Creon it appears that these things transgress, and that horrors persist, 
oh brother atop all!’ By loading Creon right after law and placing the verb, edoxa, in the 
impersonal, the syntax of the sentence can also be fulfilled by––in the second instance––
referencing Creon to the horrors that persist in that they persist for Creon, treating Creon in 
the dative as a dative of respect with the impersonal verb, edoxa, necessarily repeated 
and governing both infinitive verbs tolmân as well as hamartanein––i.e., it appears that 
these horros (deina) will persist (tolmân) with respect to Creon. 
The wisdom of a ruler does not appear to manifest in his laws anymore. There 
are more ethical motivations at work here than legislation can account for. Kara––the 
head––the son of Oedipus; his law also––as divinely inscribed––manifests but illegibly. 
As honor’s imperative is the law of the gods, this law of honor is likewise indeterminate. 
It requires dreams and attentiveness to sort ethical forces out in the world, and still 
nothing is secured in the end. Earlier in the passage, Antigone’s courage was steadfast 
(mentoi) in its hope for rekindled love with her family. Now the law of honoring the 
irreplaceable head of the great house of Cadmus is steadfast (mentoi), and the open-
ended question of how the horrors will endure and play out is cast out into the 
unfolding drama. Therefore, the steadfastness of the law of honoring is drawing the 
impossibility of divine indifference amidst other conjurings from this passage’s poetics. 
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Likewise it suggests through supple twists that for Creon it appears something––in the 
way of horrors––also endures. The Athenian audience, amidst the political infighting 
and reprisals of Sophocles’s time, would have absolutely understood what the stakes of 
bestowing these divine rituals on the fallen nobility of a political movement were for 
their own futures. 
When Antigone says, ’It appears to Creon that these transgress and that horrors 
persist’; there is a syntactical tension to the way the sentence plays out, and it is 
punctuated by her conjuring her fallen brother as ‘above all’. In Creon’s mind, the 
horrors persist due to the transgression, so punishing Antigone will rectify it; this is sort 
of how the sentence takes off. But when it ends with a different infinitive for which the 
impersonal verb and Creon in the dative apply, then the sentence’s ambiguity is felt 
retrospectively to be saying ’For Creon it appears that these things transgress and it 
appears that horrors persist for Creon.’ So rhetorically––through the expectations built 
into the sentence that summarize Creon’s belief that this must be punished and cannot 
be forgiven––the syntax of the sentence ends by suggesting, “Do you really think this 
affair is going to go away with me? Do you think the law of honor is less than Creon’s 
law of accountability and punishment?” The steadfastness of the law of honor is directed 
at the gods. Antigone is not engaging in a philosophical position about filial piety. 
Expectations would have had everyone in that audience in Athens with goose bumps as 
they felt like the gods were right there beside them watching, and riveted as Antigone 
punctuates this sentence with “oh my brother of the lineage above all!”
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Antigone then proceeds to speak of how she is suffering death by execution and 
mourns her miserable position. All of this because she followed the law of honoring: “Is 
this beautiful?” she appears to be asking the gods. “This cannot really be how this divine 
plan ends can it?” She makes her case that she was not driven out of hubris and insists 
that she would have never made the entire polity suffer because of her husband or child 
or whatever personal family matter. She is reminding the gods that this was Oedipus’s 
son, and that this, gods, is your drama. You are not going to let it end this way right? 
And she finishes by humbly reminding the gods that they are not above judgment and 
especially with regard to the law of honor. But again still humbly she tells them that all 
is forgiven and so suggests that she is not so bold as to imply that her judgment is of any 
consequence for them. 
αλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν οὖν τάδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς καλά,
Rather if these things are beautiful for the gods,
(i.e., my being bound and killed husbandless and childless for following the 
law of honor)
παθόντες ἆν ξυγγνοῖμεν ἡμαρτηκότες.
Suffering for my having sinned, I would forgive.
εἰ δ᾽ οἷδ᾽ ἁμαρτάνουσι, μὴ πλείω κακὰ
But if they are sinning, let not they more evils
πάθοιεν ἢ καὶ δρῶσιν ἐκδίκως ἐμε.148
suffer than those they visited unjustly upon me.
Antigone knows the power of the present image of what she is being made to 
suffer. She knows that the gods see what is happening to her. Her own infatuation with 
the thought of her defiance earlier in the drama was poeticized in a manner that drew 
the spectators, through a turn in the sentence, to sense her rapt enchantment with the 
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image of herself as enacting ‘a holy deed’. At that moment it was judged beautiful (kalos) 
were she to die for that deed. Now she is asking, are these things beautiful in the eyes of 
the gods? But the whole question of beauty, in light of the unfinished accounting in 
Thebes, is indeterminate in the present. That the gods may be judged accordingly should 
remind them of what they themselves visited in the world.
On the one hand, we know that this “law” was not entirely sufficient in 
explaining why she did what she did. It seemed, in her earlier deliberation, that there 
was a lot more going on that one law could account for. Yet, on the other hand, that she 
should posit such a seemingly over-reductive law is not just a reflection of her own 
doubts about what her motivations were. Antigone’s confession of her law is also the 
undoing of Creon’s earlier statement that a ruler’s character can never be known until 
we witness his laws and government. Antigone’s law suggests to us that law itself is 
never adequate to the forces at play in a world, forces that issue in and across us. They 
are spontaneously intertwined. Events like the long-duree of political feud are never 
wholly explicable or accounting in their spontaneous formation as singular momentary 
judgment/action. 
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V. The Poesis of Mukhtarian Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Meliorism
Al Sa’di of Timbuktu wrote the following in 1613 on the cosmopolitanism of 
Kunburu and of refugees in Jenne:
Sultan Kunburu [..] told them to call upon God Most High to grant the city 
three things: firstly, that anyone who fled there from his homeland in poverty 
and distress should have this translated by God into luxury and ease, so that he 
may forget his homeland; secondly, that more strangers than local folk should 
settle there; and thirdly, that those who came to trade there should lose patience 
and grow weary over selling their goods, and so dispose of them cheaply, 
allowing the people of Jenne to make a profit. They recited the Fatiha over these 
three requests, and they were accepted by God. To this day their efficacy may be 
observed and witnessed.149
Perhaps the best way to introduce Sidi al Mukhtar ibn Ahmed al Kunti in the 
context of this book would be to reintroduce the couplet that prefaced the first interlude 
on Plotinus. This time it is paired with the couplet that follows, so as to complete the 
thought of the anonymous poet whom al Kunti is citing.
Time is a garment so be of its fabric — With a day as its cloak it gathers and 
forms
And be swiftest when among the swift –– and when among fools, be most 
foolish150
 Tarikh as-Soudan by ‘Abd ar-Rahman as-Sa’di trans. John O. Hunwick. (2003) Timbuktu and the Songhay 149
Empire. Boston: Brill Press, 18-9.
 Sidi al Mukhtar al-Kunti Risalah fi ikhmad al-fitan bayn al-qaba’il Ms. 13. Hereafter cited Al-Kunti Risalah 150
Ms. pagination. The digitized folios of the manuscript of Mukhtar al Kunti’s treatise on diplomacy are 
available at the World Digital Library website under the title, “A Letter to the Warring Tribes.” World Digital 
Library––at least in their digital West African manuscript collection––does not have very many or even very 
accurate details. I have, therefore, chosen to maintain title by which the manuscript is listed in 
Mahamoudou’s chapter; he lists the work under the following Arabic title Risala min al-shaykh Sayyid al-
Mukhtar fi ikhmad al-fitan bayn al-qaba’il. Mahamane. Mahamoudou (2008) “The Works of Shaykh Sidi al-
Mukhtar al-Kunti” The Meaning of Timbuktu (eds. S. Jeppi and S. B. Diagne) Dakar: CODESRIA , 227.
Only the first forty-nine pages of the manuscript are available on the World Digital Library site. I have only 
had access to this digital copy, and do not know if the rest of the manuscript is available. The link to the 
digitized manuscript as cited in this paper is as follows:
http://www.wdl.org/en/item/199/#q=mali&qla=en 
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This is a surprising follow up to what is an otherwise very rich image of time in 
the first couplet about time. It is as if this poet he is citing goes from a quasi-Plotinian 
image of time to a quasi-Aristippian ethics of sociability in all contexts. This picture of 
time and of its tendency toward being fabric––always a textured but inter-folded day––
requires something inescapable of you that may at times go against your sensibilities 
unless you are attentive. Diplomacy does this too; it requires suspending your 
sensibilities and any visceral responses to affairs that operate in the temporality of 
immediacy. You are swift not to be swift but because the day demanded something you 
did not expect. If the end here is peace, it must not be projected into the future as 
abstract goal so much as uncovered in the fabric of the present day as part of mind’s life 
in it. This is a theory of peace grounded in the present, a present dissimulated from both 
the immediate and the teleological. 
This presentism is also about the multiple temporalities of the self in the 
overlapping of its political and affective existences. It is about how our focus on multiple 
temporal horizons in the present’s indeterminacy may allow for a disposition of 
meliorism to unfold in the presence of a day. For this thesis to have political import 
requires of its author some philosophical presentation of the mind and some poetic 
movement whereby the audience imagines or intuits this vision of the mind; and this in 
a way that mind’s temporal contours and powers may bear those features that lend 
themselves to diplomatic peace. 
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The treatise begins with a single political question: “where does the resilience 
(‘izm) of authority (al ’umur) come from?”  The answer is that it comes through 151
diplomacy, and this is especially so in moments of crisis. For this question of political 
resilience and authority––the question he knows every political actor with ambition 
attends to, the author has no theological end to posit no set of ontological, legal or 
jurisprudential maxims. No teleological deferral in favor of a historical unity. (In fact he 
takes the historiological claim of progessive time from Islamic historiography with 
relation to pre-Islamic jahiliyya––and roundly refutes it, positing instead that the age of 
jahiliyya has no past to it: all jahiliyya refers to is the situation of nations fighting each 
other out of zealotry and fanaticism).  Authority, he claims, comes from diplomacy and 152
successful diplomacy can only be through forgiveness and patient perseverance. And 
these practices can only be enacted through the powers of a mind that applies itself to 
the multiple temporalities of itself as given to varying modes of visceral anger, patient 
forbearance, temperance in cleverness etc… All of these aspects of the psyche as 
alternative modalities of the self have varying temporal horizons. Through diverse 
practices of mind, there comes the possibility of accommodating the changing fabrics of 
each days existence. 
The word al Kunti uses for diplomacy is madarat al siyasi––literally the political 
affair, but the context is given in terms that we would recognized as diplomacy. As when 
 Al-Kunti Risalah Ms. 1151
 “Jahiliyya is the condition when a nation battles another nation out of fanaticim and zealotry” Al-Kunti 152
Risalah Ms. 1
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he says, “Be good to the one whose evil is feared; that is diplomacy.”  Mind and 153
attention the the plasticity of an indeterminate present will be his response to the 
international challenges of his day. The poetics presented in this manuscript the site 
where al Kunti brokered important international peace deals like the one in 1771.  Al 154
Kunti’s presentism here focuses his audience on the indeterminate present whose 
connection with the future is yet a loose one and conducive to meliorist dispositions, but 
the possibility of political amelioration requires that people overly consolidated visions 
of self in order accommodate to multiple threads of the fabric of the day as it presents 
their interwovenness. The poetics and logic presented here are likewise intent on 
aestheticizing the viscerality of emotive life and of the embodied mind's capacities for 
managing emotions. Many of the visualization exercises here speak of gulping down 
anger,  and he cites Muhyiddin ibn al ‘Arabi as saying glory is not a fruit that you can 155
just enjoy.  The stomach is elsewhere a place for depositing visceral reactions of 156
immediacy that the mind needs to suppress.157
 Al-Kunti Risalah Ms. 9153
 Mawlay al Qasim cites the year 1771 as the year that Al Kunti came to Timbuktu and brokered a peace 154
deal between the Arma and Kel Tadmekket. Arma is the plural in Arabic for Romans al rûm sg.; these are a 
Byzantine-style class adminsitrators whose administration controlled many of the urban centers. Chronique 
de Mawlay al-Qasim (1982) in Tombouctou au milieu du XVIIIe Siècle (ed. M. Abitbol) G.P. Maisonneuve et 
Larose, texte arab de Mawlay al-Qasim, 8; also see Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (2008) “The Works of 
Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti” The Meaning of Timbuktu (eds. S. Jeppie and S. B. Diagne) Dakar: 
CODESRIA, 234 for details of the political dispute
 “ Al Hajjaj asken of Ibn al Qaria: “What is prudence?” and he replied: “That you gulp the narrowness [of 155
a situation] until you achieve the opportunity” Al-Kunti Risalah Ms. 35
 Citing poetry of ibn al ‘Arabi, “Do not count glory as a fruit that you might eat –– You will not attain 156
glory until you lick the dish of patient perseverance.” Al-Kunti Risalah Ms. 9
 “My stomach is what guards me from such anger, for I want not that it should express from itself 157
outwardly a thing that it hates and loathes.” Al-Kunti Risalah Ms. 31
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Fault lies in appetite, dread, desire and anger.158
The intensification of anger narrows vision, cuts away at the substance of 
competence and disjoints the imagination.159
There are those whose anger engulfs them, and that leads to bloodshed with 
them committing what is heinous. In this no one is worse than those religious 
authorities, particularly those of the Sultan’s court, whose command 
penetrates.160
Locating al Mukhtar al Kunti in the context of the temporal imaginaries and of 
the poetics of space and time that preceded this chapter might mean thinking of his 
poetics in relation to the presentisms of Plotinus and Aristippus. Poetically al Kunti will 
just undo the possibility for any genre barrier to be placed between poetry and 
philosophy, and this in a way that also finds cause to present his thought in the company 
of Sophocles. Also like Sophocles, in his time, Al Kunti knows that political ambition has 
no formal resolution, and in my reading the problem that al Kunti is really addressing 
through his poetics of presentism is the following. Given ambition’s inherent tendency 
to visualize an end for itself, and given the impossibility of absolving ambition from the 
world, how do you render its teleological gaze more blurred. How do you upset the 
facile clarity with which ambition posits its course of action in favor of a kind of referral 
of ambition to something supple and ambient. This is why he introduces ibn al ‘Arabi’s 
thought about glory, the image of glory is often too lucid and facile in the minds of the 
ambitious. How do you aesthetically shift focus along an alternative temporal course 
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than this clear course that the ambitious mind imagines for itself singularly? Al Kunti 
suggests you do this by focusing on the present and in so doing inviting into that 
present space a host of suppressed and rich images. This has the effect of rendering the 
present much more indeterminate and in turn this imaginally upsets that facile course of 
action as visualized in the mind of the ambitious one by making it look less facile given 
this renewed panorama of the present.
Poetics of Multilingual Spaces and the Pliability of the Political
The extent of the text’s perforation with couplets of the anonymous poets and of 
other sayings anonymously attributed alongside stories of ethics, politics and diplomacy 
invites many voices into the present and with it a world that would appear less 
compliant to visions of exclusivity. Al Kunti repeatedly cites these anonymous ‘wise 
ones’ and ‘elders’ as well as the poetry and prose of well known political figures and 
philosophers like al-Ghazali and Muhyiddin ibn al ‘Arabi––whom he cites by name on 
two occasions. But he never chooses between their very different theologies or stages a 
debate. 
In his life, his political disposition was never to dream of a philosopher city, nor 
did he lend his presence readily at court; in this manuscript, he disparages the scholars 
who frequent the courts of princes regularly. Instead, he lived in a small town well 
outside the city, and mediated peace deals while cultivating extensive pedagogical and 
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spiritual groups across an expanse of West African polities that was approximately as 
vast as Western Europe.  His writings are prolific and on all manner of subjects.161 162
Al Kunti’s manuscript on diplomacy is linguistically and temporally constructed 
in a poetics of presentism; he aestheticizes the plasticity of the present and its meliorist 
possibility by inviting bodily imagery and a host of voices that undo the singularity of 
his own voice and the uniformity of the space in which he speaks. He would have 
spoken several languages in addition to Arabic: at the very least Tamasheq since he was 
raised until the age of fourteen in a Tamasheq-speaking village, and likewise Soninke 
from his time in Walata tending to the shrine there dedicated to the follower of al Jilani, 
Ahmed al Bakkay and receiving pilgrims there.  It is likely that he spoke Songhai as 163
well since this was an important language in and around Timbuktu. He may not have 
known Hebrew but his commentaries on the stars reference what was said of them in the 
Torah.  Therefore, the voices of these anonymous poets that proliferate in his text are 164
drawn from a host of poetic traditions; they invite a rich imagery and an unimaginably 
vast crown of wise persona into his narrative in ways that undo rigid spatial distinctions 
of identity or culture etc…
 Abdal-Aziz Batran (1973) “An Introductory Note on the Impact of Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1729-1811) 161
on West African Islam in the 18th and 19th Centuries” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 4, 349; Batran 
(1974) “The Qadiryya-Mukhtaryya Brotherhood in West Africa: The Concept of Tasawwuf in the Writings of 
Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1729-1811)” Transafrican Journal of History 4, 44 
 For an overview of his corpus see Mahamane Mahamoudou (2008) “The Works of Shaykh Sidi al-162
Mukhtar al-Kunti” The Meaning of Timbuktu (eds. S. Jeppie and S. B. Diagne) Dakar: CODESRIA
 For a detailed description of his life see Yahya Ould el-Bara (2008) “The Works of Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar 163
al-Kunti” The Meaning of Timbuktu (eds. S. Jeppie and S. B. Diagne) Dakar: CODESRIA. 
 Mahamoudou, 213164
!124
Secondly, Al Kunti’s thought destabilizes judgment across fixed jurisprudential 
categories as when he says the following.
The man that would be among the people of prayer, fasting and struggle will 
not be content at the day of his rising but insofar as he has applied his mind (al 
‘aql) to things.165
 
In al Kunti’s milieu their was a deep appreciation for those whose poetics could 
convey a rich indeterminacy and polysemies across languages. On traditions of 
pedagogy and textual interpretation of religious texts in the region where al Kunti’s 
poetics and teachings traversed, Hélène Claudot-Hawad describes the Tamasheq-Berber 
poetics of translation.
I would mention the case of reinterpretations of the Qur’an into Berber 
according to analogies that are phonetic rather than semantic such as produce 
versions that lack any relation of signification to the original text. This kind of 
mischievous and iconoclastic pirating represents a difficult literary exercise 
capably performed by only those who have a perfect knowledge of the Qur’an 
and of Arabic.166
The pedagogical and scholarly community to which al Kunti belonged also knew 
the value of irony and was not prone to Gorgias's self-referential language that fails to 
find anything outside of itself in the world.  Al Kunti’s biographer recounts how he 167
first attracted a notable following at an early age. The story goes that because of his 
young age but eminent reputation, a group of leading scholars sent him an exam of 
questions to see for themselves. Al Kunti sent his reply in the form of a satyrical poem 
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 Hélène Claudot-Hawad (1989) “Les Touareg ou la résistance d’une culture nomade” in RE.M.M.M. 51, 67. 166
My translation.
 See Budelmann above in Second Interlude on Sophocles 167
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containing all the responses, and this was celebrated by his examiners as evidence of his 
scholarly credentials.  In Batran's overview of his text on Islamic practice (shari’a), he 168
points out that al Kunti tells his readers that there is another set esoteric teachings that 
are not written down and deliberately guarded by the people who understand them 
because “they may contradict the well-known precepts of the exoteric knowledge 
[presented here]”.  169
These teachings are secret, but the fact that they can contradict the shari’a is 
something he deliberately mentions, and this to point out that they may contradict what 
teachings they are reading say. This is the kind of scholar he was; he is basically saying 
that according to another logic of thinking these rules I am telling you may be suspect. 
Without suggesting that the affair of esoteric and exoteric practice in this context is 
terribly transparent or as simple as my brief description here eludes to, yet it is safe to 
say that he felt that it was important to tell the people in his public text of shari'a that all 
of these rules may actually be contingent, or abridgeable, which is to say disputable 
under a higher logic. This he did not keep a secret. Perhaps people must be reminded of 
their rules’ potential falsity.
In al Sa’di’s of Timbuktu’s history of the region Tarikh al Sudan, written around 
1613, he refers to non-Muslims of the region as maji, the term mentioned in the Qur’an 
for acknowledging other non-Judeo-Christian faiths other than Islam.  In al Kunti’s 170
 See Batran (1979) “The Kunta, Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti, and the Office of Shaykh al-Tariq al-Qadiriyya” 168
in Studies of West African Islamic History Vol.I. ed. John R. Willis. London: Frank Cass, 130; here Batran is 
citing his biographer from the Kitab al tara’if wa al tala’id.
 Batran (1974) 52 citing al Kunti’s ‘ilm al shari’a al zahira169
 Tarikh as-Soudan by ‘Abd ar-Rahman as-Sa’di trans. Hunwick. (2003), 20170
!126
time as well, the region was by no means less religiously diverse, and in his public 
issuing of scholarly opinions regarding ethics, al Kunti acknowledged that incantations 
of any form were acceptable.  He refused to criminalize alternative non-Arabic 171
incantations as other more puritanical scholars had. Similarly, nowhere in his 
manuscript on diplomacy does he ever refer to people as idolators (mushrik) or 
unbelievers (kafir) outside of the specific historical figures of the Qur’aysh who 
persecuted Muhammad. Another of his public rulings in the field of ethics maintained 
that any pilgrimage to any shrine in West Africa was to be rightly considered as fulfilling 
the sacred pilgrimage or hajj. Lastly, he never demanded any exclusivity of his followers 
but insisted that it was ethical to have multiple teachers.
This text on diplomacy carries a rich interlacing of anonymous poets with 
teachings of the classical texts, and the plenorum of voices invited to share in the 
teachings of peace and the imagery for “quelling hostilities” that al Kunti draws upon is 
striking. Al Kunti condensed international space by allowing a variety of voices to speak 
through his text. Most importantly, he was effective in brokering peace. This publicly 
expounded poetics of politics worked in 1771 and in other instances. He was renowned 
for bring resolutions, and his diplomacy affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
people across a vast expanse of polities. An ethicist today who managed to insert herself 
effectively in such a context would never be called a charismatic leader.
Finally the biography written about his life is entitled “the two saints”. It is about 
al Kunti and his wife who is also an important figure in this pedagogical milieu, and yet 
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in the historical research that has been published on al Kunti up to this point, there is 
nothing written about her. She is simply not mentioned and this despite the fact that the 
entire conclusion of the biography is about her. It is alarming that there is not more work 
in philosophy and in political thought on a scholar who is considered to have been 
preeminent both in terms of pedagogical influence, political influence and the 
extensivity of his writings. This chapter, therefore, is a modest attempt to move in the 
right direction by introducing his text of international relations as it was every bit as 
influential a text in the West Africa of the 18th century as Kant’s brief treatises on 
international relations were in 18th century Europe.
It has been said that the wise exemplify mind making with it joints as with 
the joints of the body. For the head and eyes of [mind] are innocence, and its ears 
are comprehension, and its tongue is truth-speaking, and its heart is candor, and 
its hand is mercy, and its foot is peace, and its jurisdiction is justice, and its 
course is felicity, and its weapon is soft speech, and its sword is contentment, and 
its horse is conciliation, and its arrow is amiability, and its spear is caution, its 
shield is diplomacy, and its belt is astuteness, and its armor is the consoling sage, 
and its wealth is its etiquette, and its cache is the avoidance of sin, and sincere 
faith in Allah.172
It was the command of Allah, that forgiveness be the ethics of man, and their 
diplomacy rests upon the power of their minds.173
* * * * *
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